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NOTES
Constitutional Law-Defamation-Misstatements of Fact about Public Figure Privileged
Defendant corporations published news items received from national wire services reporting involvement of the plantiff, former
Major General Edwin A. Walker, in riots at the University of
Mississippi. The stories stated that the plaintiff had led a charge
of rioters against United States marshals who were present to enforce court orders requiring integration of the university. In Walker
v. Courier Journal' the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky dismissed the complaint with prejudice,
holding that it could not be sustained constitutionally under the
ruling of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'
The Sullivan case held that the first amendment guarantee of
free speech prohibits a public official from recovering damages for defamatory misstatements of fact relating to his official conduct unless
he can prove the statements were made with actual malice.3 The
Walker court found that the Supreme Court did not intend that the
rule be limited to public officials, but must be extended to "public
men" as well. The court held that by injecting himself into an
issue of national concern the plaintiff had brought himself into the
category to which the rule should apply. Concluding that the defendants had a right to rely on the news-gathering agencies and were
not obligated to check the facts contained in the reports, the court
ruled that there could be no basis for a finding of actual malice in
republishing the reports. 4
The Walker court found justification for the extension in what
it found to be the import of the Sullivan decision. Two passages
from Sullivan were especially relied upon. The court pointed to a
footnote to the holding in which the Supreme Court suggested that
'246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
2376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'Ibid. In order to show actual malice the plaintiff must prove a knowing
falsehood or the reckless disregard of whether the statement was true or
false. Id. at 279-80.
'The widespread publication of the same statements in other newspapers
as shown by the suits Walker had pending in other jurisdictions was also
treated by the court as evidence of the lack of malice. See New Orleans
Times-Picayune, Oct. 30, 1965, § 1. p. 3, col. 1.
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it would leave to later decisions the question of how far the rule
would be extended,' implying to the Walker court that it would be
stretched beyond public officials. The court also relied on a quotation in Sullivan of dictum from Coleman v. MacLennan," a declaration that the "privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and
includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for
office." '7 Coleman, which was quoted extensively in Sullivan, is the
leading case for the rule of a minority of American jurisdictions
that before Sullivan had adopted a qualified privilege protecting
misstatements of fact about public officials 8 and candidates for
office.' This rule had not received wide acceptance before being
approved by Sullivan, and only in scattered and seemingly unrelated
decisions within the minority had it been extended beyond public
officials and candidates." ° Like Sullivan, the Coleman rule repre"We have no occasion here'to determine how far down into the lower
ranks of governmental employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons
who would or would not be included." 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. (Emphasis
added.) It could be argued that rather than implying that the rule is to be
extended beyond public officials, the Court is simply saying it did not need
to determine at that time who would or would not be included in the category
of public official.
'78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
Id. at 723, 98 Pac. at 285.
'E.g., Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921);
Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Ponder v. Cobb,
257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937);
Annot., 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and
Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 896-97 (1949).
'Eg., Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974
(1925) ; But see Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d
837 (1943). There the court limited the rule to criticism of the official acts
of public officials.
" These cases are of little help as background for a "public man" rule
because they are usually based not on any policy considerations but on a
misreading of prior cases or a confusion of privileges. In Crane v. Waters,
10 Fed. 619 (D. Mass. 1882), the court granted the privilege to statements
made about the plaintiff's attempted takeover of a railroad, but it supported
its holding by citing cases involving completely distinct privileges of fair
comment and the right to make an accurate report of legislative proceedings.
In Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 Atl. 411 (1896), where the criticism
was made of the plaintiff's construction of a public building, the court
granted the privilege as one falling into the category of the right to communicate information to one who has an interest in the subject matter,
but it was limited by Pattangall v. Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 At1. 561 (1915).
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d
440 (1955), cited Crane v. Waters, supra, Bearce v. Bass, supra, and cases
dealing with other privileges in denying recovery to a corporation president.
If there is a leading case for this minority within the minority, it is
probably McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 175 N.W. 878 (1920), in

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

sented a determination by the courts that the right of the official or
the candidate to a truthful report of his activities is outweighed by
the right of the public to free discussion of those who govern or
wish to govern it." By extending the rule, the Walker court has
declared that this right to free discussion applies also to men who
are attempting to influence the opinion of the public about a subject
in which it has an interest.
An extension of the rule beyond Sullivan to the Walker situation must be justified by the first amendment. Ideally, the task that
would befall the courts would be to formulate a definition of "public
man" that would insure a maximum freedom of speech not only
for the critic but for the public man himself. The courts must
formulate standards by which it will be possible to ascertain when
a plaintiff has brought himself into the class of public men." Two
criteria were adopted in Walker. The court first found that the
subject matter of the news reports was of "grave national concern"
and therefore a legitimate issue for widespread public discussion.
It then found that the plaintiff had injected himself into this issue
and had "interwoven his personal status into that of a public one
whereby he . . . [became] the subject of substantial press, radio

and television news comment; thus magnifying the chance that his
activities would be 'erroneously' reported.' 3 In balancing private
interests in reputation against first amendment guarantees, a court
applying a "public man" rule may be faced with two determinations
not present in Sullivan: the value of free public discussion of the
particular issue, and the extent to which the plaintiff will be deemed
which the statements charged that the leader of a campaign against a woman-

suffrage amendment was allied with the liquor interests. The court held
that the plaintiff stood much in the position of a candidate for public

office and that any information about the forces back of the campaign was a

matter of public interest and concern and therefore was privileged.
" Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
" The status of "public man" should have no relation to the extent to
which the defamation itself has created controversy or placed the plaintiff's
name before the public. But see Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal

Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955). There, plaintiff was a corporation president, and in connection with a municipal election campaign defendant stated falsely that plaintiff's business was closing and 1000 jobs were
to be lost. The court found that plaintiff as a corporation president was a
public man and that a loss of jobs was an issue of public interest. Quaere:
Should the defamation be privileged if the threatened loss of jobs was an
issue of the defendant's own invention?
" 246 F. Supp. at 234.
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to have waived protection against damaging misstatements by projecting himself into the issue.
A rule which requires the courts to determine the interest the
public has in the discussion of the issue may be as difficult to
standardize into a working definition as the concept of obscenity has
been for the Supreme Court.1 4 As long as the first amendment is
not deemed to preempt the law of libel completely,15 however, some
such limitation will have to evolve.
An inseparable part of this requirement of a "public issue" is
a determination that the individual criticized has participated in the
issue. The courts may be aided by the pre-Sullivan cases applying
privileges to criticism of persons in the public eye. The qualified
privilege protecting misstatement of fact about officials and candidates has often been confused with the fair comment privilege 0 by
the courts." The fair comment privilege arose originally as an
immunity for criticism of literary works.' 8 Later, 9 when the value
of free discussion of the government was accepted, it was extended
by analogy to criticism of government officials.2" As such, it has
21
protected comment and opinion only, not misstatement of fact,

and the jury has had the burden of distinguishing fact from opinion.2 2 The misstatement-of-fact privilege has antecedents different
from those of fair comment; its principle justification is by extension from the privilege allowing falsehoods when the person to
" See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

" It is unclear whether even Mr. Justice Black, applying his theory that

the first amendment is an "absolute," would conclude that no defamation is
ever actionable. See Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 1073, 1079-80 (1962). For an "absolutist" approach that would exclude
private libels see Meiklejohn, The First Amendnent Is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. CT. REv. 245, 259.
"' Whether fair comment is a privilege or whether statements subject to
the fair comment rule are not defamatory at all is a question that is still
debated. See 41 N.C.L. Rv. 153, 154-55 (1962).
"11 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 449 (1956). See, e.g., Crane v. Waters,
10 Fed. 619 (D. Mass. 1882); Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955).
" Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAS L. REv. 41, 53 (1929); Veeder,
Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv. 413-14 (1910).
" In the early nineteenth century criticism of government officials was
still severely inhibited by libel laws while criticism of literary works was

privileged. See

HOLT, LIBEL

96, 213 (Am. ed. 1818).

Hallen, supra note 18, at 53; Veeder, supra note 18, at 414.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 606(1), comment b (1938).
"Id. § 618.
20
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whom the publication is made has a protectible interest in the facts
communicated.23
Fair comment, like the misstatement-of-fact privilege, is to a
24
great extent a recognition of the public interest in free discussion,
but in many cases there are other weighty considerations that move
the courts to invoke fair comment. The court may conclude in a
particular case that one who submits himself to public scrutiny for
profit or for personal gratification should not complain when the
reaction is not to his liking since he is in effect asking to be judged.2 5
Further, the court naturally hesitates to enter the field of literary,
artistic, or political criticism by attempting to set up standards by
which to determine the justification of damaging opinion.2" Neither
of these arguments has much force in the typical case of misstatement of fact concerning a public official or candidate for office. The
public official or candidate is asking to be judged in an even more
literal sense than the artist, and the right to fair comment applies
to his critics with equal or greater force. By inviting opinion he is
risking his reputation, but it does not follow that he is courting
misstatements of fact simply by taking a public stand. Misstatements may be more likely to occur, but this is because of the public
interest in reporting his activities. In that sense, the simple fact
that he has submitted himself to public scrutiny bears no logical
relation to the misstatement privilege. Indeed, the facts of his public
activities are more easily accessible because they are public.
The second argument buttressing the right to fair comment, that
the court's opinion is no more correct than the critic's, is also largely
inapplicable to the misstatement privilege. Granting the practical
7
and theoretical difficulties of distinguishing fact from opinion, the
court still is more justified in allowing the jury to determine that
a fact is true or false than that an opinion is reasonable or unreasonable.
The public figure concept that gives rise to a privilege in the
See Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 AtI. 411 (1896); Burt v. Advertiser
Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242-43, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891) (recognizing
the analogy but denying its application).
" See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 110 (3rd ed. 1964); 1 HARPER &
JAMEs, TORTS § 5.28 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-07 (1938).
" Carr v. Hood, 1 Camp. 355, 358, 170 Eng. Rep. 983, 985 (K.B. 1808).
"' See, e.g., Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St.
118, 137, 95 N.E. 735, 740 (1911).
" See Noel, supra note 8, at 878-80.
23
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right-to-privacy cases is similar to fair comment in that it includes
not only those who abhor publicity but must suffer it because of
the public interest involved (i.e., the criminal), but also those who
have sought publicity and for whom a claim to a right of privacy
would be therefore contradictory. 28
The definition of "public man" for the purpose of extending
the Sullivan rule presumably would be narrower than that applied
to fair comment and the right to privacy. It would be based on
public interest and only insofar as that interest is protected by the
first amendment. The extent to which a plaintiff is known should
be weighed only in determining the public interest in discussing his
activities. The criticism engendered by his public stand must fall
within the purview of the first amendment's assurance of the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people." '29 In a new York case,
Dempsey v. Time Inc.,30 the court refused to extend the Sullivan
privilege to a magazine article containing defamatory material about
one of the famous prizefighter's bouts. The court was of the opinion
that public interest in discussing a sports event of forty years ago
was not sufficient to be protected by a first amendment privilege."
Another consideration that must be weighed in a judicial formulation of a "public man" rule is the possibility that a broad privilege
will inhibit public discussion rather than encourage it. The classic
objection to the Sullivan privilege as it existed at the common law
was that such a rule would tend to discourage qualified people from
See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383, 410-15 (1960).
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
"043 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
" Cf. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1964). There a famous baseball pitcher was granted an injunction against publication of a fictionalized biography on the grounds that it
2"

2

invaded his right of privacy. The court rejected any application of the

Sullivan rule. But cf. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d
Cir. 1964) (dictum). There, the statements were made about the pacifist
beliefs of a renowned scientist. The court suggested that had it not held
for the defendant on other grounds it would have done so by application of

Sullivan. Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup.
Ct. 1964). In this case the defendant suggested that the mayor permitted
a conflict of interest in allowing members of his law firm to practice before

the city court. Plaintiff, a member of the firm, was denied recovery on the

alternate grounds that he was not sufficiently identified as one to whom the

damaging statements referred and that his position was so closely related
to that of the mayor as to make him a "public official" within the meaning
of the rule in Sullivan.
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seeking office. If this argument seems to underestimate the mettle
of American politicians, 3 it becomes more relevant when applied to
the public man or the potential public man. If the rule is limited
to include only those who wield great power and influence, there
would seem to be no danger, but if every writer of letters to the
editor or soapbox speaker becomes subject to massive and permissively irresponsible criticism by the press for which he has no legal
redress, there may be fewer such people. The first amendment may
cut two ways; it should not be interpreted so as to inhibit the public
man any more than his critics. In Barr v. Matteo34 the Supreme
Court held that the head of a federal executive department had an
absolute privilege against a libel action for a publication within his
official discretion. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent3 5 pointed out
that this holding created an imbalance likely to limit public discussion, since there was no generally corresponding privilege accorded
to critics of executive officers. In a sense the Sullivan case restored
the balance and even extended it, since criticism of all public officials
is privileged. The question arises whether a privilege protecting
misstatements about public men requires some sort of re-balancing
of rights that will protect the interests and free speech rights of
one who may be a public man. If the rule is extended, will it provide
the balance within itself, so that whoever criticizes the public man
will automatically become a public man himself and subject to the
rule? Granted that it will, the right to counterattack hardly seems
a realistic remedy to some classes of persons who could conceivably
be deemed public men. 6
JOHN

L. W.

GARROU

" See Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 541 (6th Cir. 1893).
" See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 733-34, 98 Pac. 281, 289
(1908) ; Noel, supra note 8, at 895.
'360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Id. at 578.
"See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel, 49 CORMELL
L.Q. 581, 602-03 (1964). Two recent cases have declined to follow the
holding of the principal case primarily because each court felt that to do
so would destroy the balance created by Barr v. Matteo and the Sullivan
case. Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2297 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 23, 1965); Clark v. Pearson, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2338 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
1965).
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Corporations-Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Not Qualified
to Transact Business in North Carolina
In 1955 the North Carolina Legislature enacted two statutes
that govern in personam' jurisdiction over foreign corporations that
are not qualified to transact business in North Carolina.2 These
statutes concern corporations that have either transacted business in
the state or have committed some act within the state which would
1 "A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights
and obligations brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the
person . . ." 1 Am. Jun. 2D Actions § 39 (1962). "A proceeding in rem is
essentially a proceeding to determine the right in specific property,
against
all the world, equally binding on everyone." 1 Am. JuR. 2 D Actions § 40
(1962).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1143, § 1. These statutes were first codified
into law as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.05, -38.1 (Supp. 1955) to go into
effect upon adoption. Six days later the Legislature adopted the Business
Corporation Act, N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1371, § 1, which was not to go
into effect until July 1, 1957. When the Business Corporation Act went
into effect, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.05, -38.1 were recodified as N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-144, -145 (1960). The language was not changed.
Whenever a foreign corporation shall transact business in this State
without, first procuring a certificate of authority so to do from the
Secretary of State or after its certificate of authority shall have been
withdrawn, suspended, or revoked, then the Secretary of State shall
be an agent of such corporation upon whom any process, notice, or
demand in any suit upon a cause of action arising out of such business
may be served.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-144 (1965).
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, by a
resident of this State or by a person having a usual place of business
in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting
or has transacted business in this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of
action arising as follows:
(1) Out of any contract made in this State or to be performed in
this State; or
(2) Out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise
if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the
orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without
this State; or
(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are
to be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed,
regardless of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured,
marketed, or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers; or
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of
repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1965).
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subject them to jurisdiction. The North Carolina Supreme Court
recently decided cases that invoke each of the statutes.
In Byham v. National Cibo House Corp.,3 the plaintiff, a North
Carolina resident, sought rescission on grounds of fraud of a chain
restaurant franchise contract. The defendant, a Tennessee corporation, contended that the North Carolina courts did not have jurisdiction because the contract was made not in North Carolina but in
Tennessee when it was accepted in defendant's home office. The
court found that the contract was to be performed in North Carolina and held that the North Carolina court had in personam jurisdiction on the basis of the minimum contact statute, section 55145 (a) of the Business Corporation Act.4
In Abney Mills, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Co.,' the plaintiff, a
South Carolina corporation, was seeking damages for an alleged
breach of contract by the defendant, a Delaware corporation having
its principal place of business in Missouri. The contract, made in
South Carolina, stated the defendant would purchase a fifty-seven
per cent interest in Kilgo Motor Freight, a North Carolina corporation owned by the plaintiff and others. While awaiting approval
from the Interstate Commerce Commission, the parties to the contract made an agreement that the defendant would have temporary
management control and would be substituted for Kilgo's board of
directors. The defendant's president came to North Carolina and
took over active management control of Kilgo for seven months. At
the time the transfer was to be completed, the defendant did not
have funds available to consummate the sale, and it terminated the
management control agreement. The plaintiff instituted proceedings
in the North Carolina court. The defendant contended this court
did not have jurisdiction because the action did not arise out of
any business transacted in North Carolina. The trial court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court remanded the suit for further
findings of facts to determine if the defendant's activities in North
Carolina were sufficient to subject it to the transacting business
'265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965).
'There was evidence that the defendant had solicited for customers in

North Carolina by mail and in newspaper advertisements, but the court did
not mention this as a basis for jurisdiction under § 55-145 (a) (2) (business
solicited in this state). Nor did it mention § 55-145(a) (4) (tortious conduct in this state) concerning the defendant's alleged fraudulent representation as a basis.
265 N.C. 61, 143 S.E.2d 235 (1965).
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statute, section 55-144, and also to determine further finding of
facts concerning the locus of the breach of contract.
Historically, jurisdiction over foreign corporations has been
granted on such theories as implied consent6 or presence 7 while the
corporation was doing business within the state. The modern, more
liberal view originated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'
a landmark decision expressing approval of a "minimum contacts
test" 9 whereby it becomes unnecessary for the corporation to be
transacting business in the forum state. This theory has been held
valid when there was as little as one contact, an insurance contract
renewal, with the forum state." The Court attributed the trend
to this liberal view to improved transportation and communication.
It recognized that the burden of a party having to defend himself in
a state where he had engaged in economic activity had been reduced." But later, in Hanson v. Denckla,'2 the Court cautioned
that the trend did not remove all restrictions on the personal jurisdictions of state courts. 13
What, then, are the limits within which North Carolina courts
may exercise jurisdiction over corporations not qualified to transact
business in North Carolina? This is a question of whether or not
the state statute meets the due process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment and whether or not the defendant has committed the
activities designated by the statute. While a particular decision can
serve as a guide for future litigants, each holding in this area is
necessarily limited to the particular facts before the court.
Section 55-144 replaced the jurisdictional statute14 in effect prior
to 1955; the present statute uses the term "transacting business"
instead of "doing business," the term used in the earlier statute.
' See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
See Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
' [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."
Id. at 316.
"0McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
12Id. at 222, 223.
1 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
23Id. at 251.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 5. [Last codification was N.C. GFN STAT.
§ 55-38 (1950).]

452
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Only in Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp.1" has a court
noted this substitution prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Abney Mills. In Worley's the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina said that changing the statute
from "doing business" to "transacting business" only had the effect
16
of liberalizing the statute.

Thus, it would seem that any factual situation litigated prior to
1955 that was held to constitute "doing business" would still be
good authority for "transacting business" today. However, the
authority of a decision that held the activities did not constitute
"doing business" prior to 1955 would seem to be weakened. If the
substitution did liberalize the statute, some of these activities might
conceivably be considered as "transacting business" now.
Apparently the courts have not considered the substitution of
tremendous import because later decisions still wrestle with the question of the corporation's "doing business," making no reference to
"transacting business."' 7 But, the court has used "transacting busi8
ness" and "doing business" interchangeably.1
In Abney Mills the court has given a qualified definition of
"transacting business." It relied upon previous holdings in Lambert
v. Schell"0 and Ruark v. Virginia Trust Co.2 for definitions of
"' 167 F. Supp. 498 (E.D.N.C. 1958).
1
'Id. at 504.
" Edwards v. Scott & Fetzer, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 41 (M.D.N.C. 1957);
Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.2d
3 (1965); Babson v. Clairol, Inc., 256 N.C. 227, 123 S.E.2d 508 (1962);
Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., 244 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d 803 (1956);
Housing Authority v. Brown, 244 N.C. 592, 94 S.E.2d 582 (1956). In
Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., supra, the trial court had found
jurisdiction on the basis of §§ 55-38 and 55-38.1 (a) (1), (3) [now §
55-145(a)(1), (3)]. The court said: "We conclude the evidence before
the trial court was sufficient to support the finding the defendant was doing
It becomes unnecessary to consider or pass
business in North Carolina ....
upon the constitutionality of G.S. 55-38.1(1) (3) ... ." Id. at 678, 94 S.E.2d
at 805-06. [The court, throughout the decision, referred to the statute as
G.S. 55-38.1(1)(3) instead of G.S. 55-38.1(a) (1), (3).] It is true N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (1950) was still in effect at this time, but so was N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38.05 (Supp. 1955). See text accompanying note 2, supra.
Section 55-38.05 has been mentioned in only one decision, Putnam v. Triangle
Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957). The court said the
plaintiff sought service of process pursuant to § 55-38.05, but in the opinion,
the court talked about why the plaintiff could not have service of process
according to § 55-381
" United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964) ; Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., supra note 17.
" Doing business in this State means doing some of the things or
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"doing business" and said these same definitions applied to "transacting business." But, the court cautioned that these definitions
were definitely not an all-embracing rule as to the meaning of "transacting business."2
Courts have pointed out that of the two statutes, section 55-144,
the transacting business statute, is the only one available to a nonresident plaintiff or to a plaintiff that does not have a usual place
of business in North Carolina. 2 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has also pointed out that to make the transacting business
statute applicable, two requirements must be met: (1) the defendant
must have transacted business in North Carolina; and (2) the cause
of action must have arisen out of such business.?
Section 55-145 (a), the minimum contact statute, grants jurisdiction in four specific instances though the corporation is not transacting business in North Carolina: (1) if the corporation makes a
contract in this state or one to be performed in this state; (2) if
the corporation solicits business in this state; (3) if the corporation can reasonably expect its goods to be used in this state; or
(4) if the corporation commits a tort in this state. The statute
applies "whether or not such corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this State .... ,2 However, if the corporation is
transacting business, jurisdiction would attach by virtue of the transacting business statute, so for all practical purposes, the statute
need apply only in cases in which the corporation has not transacted
exercising some of the functions in this State for which the corporation was created. And the business done by it here must be of such
nature and character as to warrant the inference that the corporation
has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction and is, by its duly
authorized officers and agents, present within the State.
235 N.C. 21, 25, 69 S.E.2d 11, 13-14 (1952).
" "The expression 'doing business in this state,' . . . means engaging in,
carrying on, or exercising, in this State, some of the things, or some' of
the functions, for which the corporation was created." 206 N.C. 564, 565,
174 S.E. 441, 442 (1934).
21265 N.C. at 71, 143 S.E.2d at 242.
"United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964); Schnur & Cohan, Inc. v. McDonald, 220 F. Supp. 9 (M.D.N.C.
1963). Bitt see Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store, Inc., 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d
131 (1959). The plaintiff was a resident of Florida and the defendant was
a South Carolina corporation. The court found jurisdiction on the basis of
InternationalShoe and did not mention any statute.
"Abney Mills, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Co., 265 N.C. 61, 143 S.E.2d
235 (1965); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. 3. B. Hunt & Sons, 260 N.C.
717, 133 S.E.2d 644 (1963).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a) (1965).
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business in North Carolina. 25 Nevertheless, if the corporation has
not transacted business, the rule of the "minimum contacts test"
must be met to assure that due process is satisfied.
The court in Byhain set forth the factors it will consider in
determining if the "minimum contacts test" and "fair play" required in InternationalShoe have been met.28 These are:
(a) Did the form of substituted service reasonably assure that
notice to the defendant would be actual ?27
(b) Did the defendant do some act invoking the benefits as well
as the burdens of the forum state's laws ?28
(c) Did the forum state have an interest of its residents to protect ?2

(d) Did the defendant have access to the courts of the forum
state to enforce obligations of its residents ?3
(e) Was the defendant caused great inconvenience in defending
a suit away from home ?31
(f) Were the witnesses and material evidence to be found in the
forum state? 32
(g) Would it be economically practical for plaintiff to pursue
his suit in defendant's home state ?33
(h) If the suit was based on a contract, did it have a substantial
34
connection with the forum state?
"It is possible that a corporation could be transacting one type of business in North Carolina and another type in State A. If the plaintiff brings
suit in North Carolina because defendant manufactured goods in State A
that it could reasonably expect to be used in North Carolina, his suit would
have to be brought under § 55-145(a) (3) instead of § 55-144. Under §
55-144, the cause of action must arise out of the business transacted in
North Carolina. In this hypothetical the business transacted in North Carolina has no connection with plaintiff's cause of action, so it is conceivable
that a corporation admittedly transacting business within the state would be
subject to § 55-145(a). It is obvious that this is a possibility that will
rarely occur.
265 N.C. at 56-57, 143 S.E.2d at 231-32.
87 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, supra note 27.
"0See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
0 See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex ret. State Corp. Comm'n,
supra note 29.
8 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S.
643 (1950).
"See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 32.
"Ibid.
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(i) How much authority has been given the courts by the legislature of the forum state ?5
The court deems (a), (b) and (i) essential to meet due process
requirements, while consideration will be given to (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g) and (h)-3 Factor (d) seems to be redundant in that it is
included in (b). Factors (e), (f) and (g) are the hardship criteria
as they affect the defendant, the claimant, or the witnesses and
material evidence. Actually these factors seem to be more related
to making a determination of whether or not the doctrine of forum
non conveniens applies than they d6 to determine whether or not
jurisdiction has attached. Since a liberal trend in jurisdiction is
evolving, these factors should have a lessening weight in the ultimate determination because of decreasing hardships. But they
should certainly be considered to prevent gross miscarriages of justice.
Subsection (1) (contract made or to be performed in this state)
of section 55-145(a), the minimum contact statute, has been held
valid as the sole basis for granting jurisdiction to North Carolina
courts, 3 7 as have subsections (3) (reasonable expectation goods will
be used in this state)3 8 and (4) (tortious conduct in this state)."
The courts have yet to rule on the validity of subsection (2) (business solicited in this state) alone as a basis for jurisdiction, but
they have held it valid in conjunction with one of the other subsections in some cases."
" See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952);
Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Gavenda Bros. v.
Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732, 116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
265 N.C. at 56, 143 S.E.2d at 231.
8 Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225
(1965) (contract for franchise for chain restaurant).
88 Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704
(1959)
(home appliance manufacturer could reasonably expect products to be used
in state).
" Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957). The
defendant was guilty of wrongfully taking plaintiff's automobile by duress
without any legal process or right, and of invading plaintiff's privacy
causing public humiliation.
"°Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498
(E.D.N.C. 1958); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963).
In Worley's the court found jurisdiction on basis of §§ 55-144, -145 (a) (1)(3). The defendant's representatives had personally solicited the plaintiff to
handle defendant's product in North Carolina. In Farmer the court found
jurisdiction on the basis of § 55-145 (a) (1)- (4). The defendant had solicited
its orders by advertisements in Billboard magazine and also had sent mimeographed lists of products for sale to customers in North Carolina.
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It has been held unconstitutional to apply subsection (3) to the
facts of a particular case on two occasions, 41 and in conjunction
with subsection (4) on one occasion.42 Subsection (4) has been
",Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d
445 (1957). In Putnam the plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, sued the
defendant, a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania, for libel and invasion of privacy for an article in defendant's
magazine. The defendant had sold the magazines to independent wholesalers in North Carolina, but title had passed outside the state. Defendant's
only contact with North Carolina was that three of its representatives
entered North Carolina two to five times a year to promote sales to news
dealers and television stations. The court held that the defendant did not
have sufficient ties with North Carolina to satisfy due process requirements
and that N.C. GrEN. STAT. § 55-38.1(a) (3) [now § 55-145(a) (3)] would
be unconstitutional if applied to the facts in this case. Id. at 443, 96 S.E.2d
at 454. The court in Worley's said that did not mean that the statute would
not be constitutional under a different set of facts. 167 F. Supp. at 505-06.
For a criticism of the court's decision in Putnam, see 7 DuKE L.J. 135
(1958). In Erlanger Mills the plaintiff, a North Carolina corporation,
placed an order with the defendant, a New York corporation having its
principal place of business in New York, for some yarn after plaintiff's
representative visited the defendant's mill in New York. The contract was
accepted in New York and the goods were shipped f. o. b. New York.
Plaintiff found some defective yarn in the shipment and sued to recover
damages. The defendant's only contact with North Carolina was that its
general manager came to plaintiff's plant in North Carolina to discuss the
complaint. Service was made on the general manager while he was here
and not through the Secretary of State as prescribed in § 55-146. The court
held that to sustain jurisdiction would be offensive to the due process clause.
239 F.2d at 507. Judge Sobeloff posed this hypothetical:
To illustrate the logical and not too improbable extension of the
problem, let us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel
if asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license
plates, knowing that he might be required to defend in the courts of
Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy
damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires. As in
the hypothetical case, the sale in the principal case was "with the
reasonable expectation that these goods are to be used or consumed in
[the vendee's domicile] and are so used and consumed." It is difficult
to conceive of a more serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of
commerce between the states.
Ibid.
"Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
The plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, was injured by an object thrown
by a lawn mower manufactured by the defendant, an Illinois corporation
with its principal place of business in Illinois. The lawn mower was being
used by a city employee., The manufacturing defendant had sold the mower
to a distributor and independent contractor in Virginia, who had in turn
sold it to a retail dealer in Winston-Salem, who in turn had sold it to
the city. The manufacturing defendant had no representatives in North
Carolina and had never been present in North Carolina. The court said
the defendant had no contacts with North Carolina that would make it
amenable to process from the courts of North Carolina, based on the Putain
decision. Id. at 484, 119 S.E.2d at 448.
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held unconstitutionally applied to particular facts in only one case.4
Occasionally the court is faced with a jurisdictional claim based
on both the transacting business statute and the minimum contact
statute and has decided on the "transacting business" basis, refusing
to consider the constitutionality of the subsections of section 55145 (a).44
Only two cases holding application of the statutes to the particular facts of the cases unconstitutional have been decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court." On the other hand, in every case
except one4" that has been decided in a federal court, sufficient "minimum contacts" have been held to be lacking4 7 or the defendant
corporation has been deemed not to be "transacting business." 4
This indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court is more ready
to grant jurisdiction to protect North Carolina residents, quite
naturally, and that it has taken the supposedly liberal interpretation
" Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960). The
plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, was injured because of the alleged
negligence of the defendant, a South Carolina corporation with its principal
place of business in South Carolina, in repairing her car. Defendant's
contacts with North Carolina were occasional visits to the Chrysler assembly
plant in North Carolina to see new automobiles, for which he was a dealer,
and telephoning or writing the regional office in North Carolina. The
court said to sustain jurisdiction would be offensive to the due process
clause, relying on the ErlangerMills case. Id. at 3.
" Spartan Equip. Co. v. Air Placement Equip. Co., 263 N.C. 549, 140
S.E.2d 3 (1965); Babson v. Clairol, Inc., 256 N.C. 227, 123 S.E.2d 508
(1962); Harrington v. Croft Steel Prods., Inc., 244 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d
803 (1956), see note 17 supra. In Spartan Equip. Co. the trial court found
that jurisdiction could be had on the basis of § 55-145(a)(1)-(4), but the
appellate court ignored the applicability of § 55-145 (a) and found that the
defendant was "doing business" in North Carolina. 263 N.C. at 556, 140
S.E.2d at 9. The court made no mention of "transacting business" in the
opinion, but did refer to § 55-144. When referring to International Shoe,
the court referred to "continuous and systematic activities" instead of "minimum contacts." Ibid.
"'Moss v. City of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961);
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. J. B. Hunt & Sons, 260 N.C. 717, 133 S.E.2d
644 (1963), the court did not grant jurisdiction because the alleged tort was
committed in Virginia instead of North Carolina, so the North Carolina
statute was not applicable.
" Worley's Beverages, Inc. v. Bubble Up Corp., 167 F. Supp. 498
(E.D.N.C. 1958).
•' Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956); Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1960).
8United States v. Atlantic Contractors, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.
1964); Schnur & Cohan, Inc. v. McDonald, 220 F. Supp. 9 (M.D.N.C.
1963); Edwards v. Scott & Fetzer, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 41 (M.D.N.C. 1957).
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offered by International Shoe more to heart than have the federal
courts.
The drafters of the Business Corporation Act intended that the
local residents should have as much protection as possible.
It is thought the wise policy favors subjecting such foreign corporations to suit here for the convenience of residents of this
state where it is constitutionally possible, since the alternative is
to force
our residents to bring their actions in foreign jurisdic9
tions.4
While the decisions in the Byham and Abney Mills cases are not
earth-shaking deviations from a trend, the guidelines furnished by
the North Carolina Supreme Court as to what it considers to be
"transacting business" in section 55-144 and what constitutes "minimum contacts" in allowing jurisdiction under section 55-145 (a) are
useful. Nevertheless, the basic problem of applying these concepts to
the particular activities of the defendant corporation will continue
to confront the court. It is inconceivable that this problem can be
alleviated by substitution of legal rule for ad hoc judgment.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Criminal Law-Credit for Time Served Under a Vacated Judgment
Upon Retrial and Second Conviction
In the recent case of State v. Weaver' the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed its former position and allowed the time
served in prison by the defendant prior to his collateral attack upon
the previous proceedings and subsequent retrial and conviction, to
count toward his prison sentence resulting from his second trial.'
Defendant was first tried in May 1963 and pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of felonious assault.3 He was sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of not less than five or more than seven
"'Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business
CorporationAct, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 54 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
1264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965).
2 Id. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953) provides:
Any person who assaults another with a deadly weapon with the
intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in death, shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison or be worked under the supervision of the State Highway
and Public Works Commission for a period of not less than four
months nor more than ten years.
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years. On May 9, 1963, he was committed to state prison and began4
serving the sentence. On September 25, 1964, after a habeas corpus
hearing in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina, defendant was awarded a new trial.5 From
October 8, 1964, until the new trial in December 1964, he was confined in county jail, apparently because of failure to meet the bond
requirement.' At the second trial in December 1964 defendant was
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon-a general misdemeanor'
-which is a crime of less degree than the one for which he was
charged at the first trial.' Defendant was sentenced to two years, 9
which was the maximum legal sentence for this offense. 10
The North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that from May 9,
1963, until September 25, 1964, defendant's de facto status was
that of a prisoner serving a sentence and that this time should be
credited against the two-year maximum sentence imposed at the
second trial. The court further ruled that the defendant's status
from September 25, 1964, until the second trial in December 1964
was that of a person under indictment awaiting trial, and in custody
on account of his failure to give the appearance bond fixed by the
district court. This time would not be credited to the sentence
imposed at the second trial."
There are four situations where the question of credit for time
'See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1959), which provides for the writ of habeas
corpus to extend to a prisoner who is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
5264 N.C. at 682, 142 S.E.2d at 634 (reversed on grounds that defendant
had not been represented by counsel at the first trial).
8 Id. at 683, 142 S.E.2d at 635.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953) provides: "In all cases of assault,
with or without the intent to kill or injure, the person convicted shall be
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court."
(Emphasis added.)
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953). See State v. Hefner, 199 N.C. 778,
155 S.E. 879 (1930).
9264 N.C. at 682, 142 S.E.2d at 635. The defendant, upon retrial, was
charged with felonious assault, but since the jury was probably instructed
that assault with a deadly weapon was a lower degree of the same offense,
they returned a verdict of guilty for the misdemeanor.
10

N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 14-33. The statute itself does not provide a minimum

and maximum sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, and the only
restriction is that against cruel and unusual punishment imposed by N.C.
CONsT. art. 1, § 14. See State v. Crandall 225 N.C. 148, 33 S.E.2d 861
(1945) (two years not cruel and unusual punishment); but see State v.
Austin, 241 N.C. 548, 550, 85 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955) (two years the maximum sentence).
11264 N.C. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
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previously served is likely to arise: (1) where, as in Weaver, the
sentence imposed at the second trial is for the maximum legal
sentence; (2) where the sentence imposed at the second trial is not
for the maximum legal sentence, and when added to the time served
under the vacated judgment the aggregate does not exceed the maximum legal sentence; (3) where the sentence imposed at the second
trial is not for the maximum legal sentence but when added to the
time served under the vacated judgment the aggregate does exceed
the maximum legal sentence; and (4) where the defendant has been
confined in jail because of his inability to raise bond or because of
the denial of bond.
In the situation where the maximum legal sentence was imposed
at the second trial, the North Carolina court had, prior to Weaver,
followed the rule that time served in prison under a prior conviction would not as a matter of law be credited to a subsequent sentence resulting from a valid trial. This position was adopted in
State v. Williams.12 In that case the defendant was convicted of
larceny on February 19, 1963, and sentenced to two years in prison.
On July 8, 1963, he was awarded a new trial' in a post-conviction
hearing. 4 On July 29, 1963, he was again convicted of larceny
and sentenced to ten years. The court refused to allow credit for the
time served under the vacated judgment, stating merely that "defendant's contention that the judge was compelled to allow him credit
for the period spent in prison before a valid trial was had is also
without merit." 5 There was no citation of authority, and the fact
that the second sentence imposed a maximum prison sentence was
not stressed.
In the later case of State v. White,"6 decided in the same year,
12261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964).

" N.C. GEN.

1"

STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1965).
Defendant was awarded a new trial because he had not been afforded

the benefit of counsel.
"a261 N.C. at 174, 134 S.E.2d 163 at 165. However the court did state

that "the mere fact that different judges impose different punishment does

not invalidate the sentence imposed at the second trial." Ibid.
10262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1005
(1965). In White, as in Williams, the defendants were given a longer prison
term upon appeal and retrial. For a more complete discussion of the constitutional aspect of these cases see Alstyne, It Gideon's Wake, 74 YALE L.J.
606 (1965); 1965 DUKE L.J. 395. For a discussion of the wide discretion
of the trial judge in imposing sentence see Penegar, Criminal Law Sanctions in Two Civil Rights Cases-A Brief Comparison, 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 667
(1965).
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the court reconsidered its position and examined the existing authority 7 but did not allow credit for the time served under the vacated
judgment. The court stated that a majority of courts have denied
credit in such situations and that "the rationale of the decisions
seems to be that the defendant in seeking and obtaining a new trial
must be deemed to have consented to a wiping out of all the consequences of the first trial. This is not a denial of defendant's constitutional rights. .

.""

In White the defendant was tried and

convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to be imprisoned for ten
years. Subsequently, he obtained a new trial and was again convicted
of armed robbery and sentenced to be imprisoned from twelve to
fifteen years,' 9 a term that was not for the maximum legal sentence,20 nor when added to the time already served under the vacated
judgment did it total the maximum legal sentence. In this respect
White was distinguishable from Williams and some of the authority
relied upon in White would not have been applicable in deciding
Williams.='
After White, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Anderson 2 did not allow the time served under the vacated judgment to count toward a second sentence. This case was factually
in accord with White and distinguishable from Williams, i.e., the
maximum sentence was not imposed. The court denied credit on the
authority of White without discussion.23
"'See, e.g. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922
(1952); In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N.W.2d 251 (1948); In re De
Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N.W.2d 255, cert denied, 336 U.S. 946 (1948);
People v. Trezza, 128 N.Y. 529, 28 N.E. 533 (1891); People ex rel. Lenefsky
v. Ashworth, 56 N.Y.S.2d 5, (Sup. Ct. 1945); Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla.
Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943); Ogle v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63
S.W. 1009 (1901); State ex rel. Drankovich v. Murphy, 248 Wis. 433, 22
N.W.2d
540 (1946).
18 262 N.C. at 56, 136 S.E.2d at 208.
29Id.at 53, 136 S.E.2d at 205.

"N.C.

GEN. STAT. §§ 14-87 (1953).
E.g., In re Doelle, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N.W.2d 251 (1948) (no maximum
sentence imposed at second trial). Cf. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.
445, 108 N.E.2d 922 (1952) (maximum sentefice given, but credit allowed).
Had this case been followed in deciding Williams, a different result would
have been obtained.
22262 N.C. 491, 137 S.E.2d 823 (1964). Defendant was indicted upon a
charge of rape. He entered a plea of guilty to assault with the intent to
commit rape and was sentenced to be imprisoned for not less than twelve
or more than fifteen years. After serving almost three years of the sentence
he was awarded a new trial. He entered the same plea again, and this time
five years.
was sentenced to
2 262 N.C. at 492, 137 S.E.2d at 824.
2
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Until Weaver the court was not called upon to decide a case
where the time served under a vacated judgment added to the sentence imposed at the second trial totaled more than the maximum
legal sentence. The court, in allowing credit for the time served
under the first sentence, stated that Williams, to the extent that it
was in conflict with Weaver was overruled.24 The position of the
North Carolina Court in Weaver seems to be in accord with the
weight of authority.25
An examination of the decisions from various jurisdictions reveals that several theories have been advanced to support the position of not allowing the time served under the vacated judgment to
be credited to the sentence imposed at the second trial. One such
theory is that the first sentence is void, and hence the state has no
responsibility for the punishment the individual has undergone;26
however some courts say that the sentence is merely erroneous and
allow credit for time served." The waiver theory has been used
to deny credit in this situation with, the courts emphasizing the fact
that the defendant himself procured the reversal thereby waiving
the benefit of time served. No court has found a constitutional requirement that credit be allowed;18 however, a growing number of
2'264 N.C. at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.

" This precise question seems to have been answered in In Matter of
Leypoldt, 32 Cal. App. 2d 518, 90 P.2d 91 (1939); Kozlowski v. Board of
Trustees of New Castle County Workhouse, 2 W. W. Harr. (32 Del.) 29,
118 A. 596 (1921); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108 N.E.2d 922
(1952). Substantially the same question seems to have been decided in
Youst v. United States, 151 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1945); People v. Huber,
389 Il. 192, 58 N.E.2d 879 (1945); People v. Gilbert, 163 Mich. 511, 128
N.W. 756 (1910); see King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.D.C. 1938);
People v. Brown, 383 Ill. 287, 48 N.E.2d 953 (1943). All of these decisions tend to support the decision in Weaver.
" See 45 Micn. L. REv. 912 (1947); 12 U. DET. L.J. 135 (1949).
"*The "waiver" doctrine is a device created to prevent a defendant from
claiming double jeopardy after winning a second trial. Comely, Former
Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 685 (1926), maintains that the "waiver"
doctrine was first stated in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), in which
there was no claim for double jeopardy. See Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (no waiver, and double jeopardy not applicable).
But see People v. Wilson, 391 Ill. 463, 63 N.E.2d 488 (1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 801 (1946). In Illinois the 1941 Indeterminate Sentence Law had
been declared unconstitutional in People v. Montana, 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d
569 (1942). During its short life many defendants had been sentenced
under the enactment. Upon resentencing, even though there had been no
appeal and retrial, and hence no waiver, the Illinois court denied credit.
" E.g., Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943)
(no constitutional power in the court to allow credit).
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jurisdictions do grant credit with2 9 or without 0 legislative enactment. One state has even made its statutory provision retroactive,
applying it to all persons in prison at the time of its enactment who
had not been granted creditY'
Prior to Weaver the North Carolina court had rejected the
theory that a previous sentence was void, holding that it was merely
erroneous and hence voidable at the instance of the defendant.'
In Weaver the court took a definite step away from the harsh
technicalities heretofore imposed to deny credit for the time served
before a defendant has been granted a new trial. It intimated that
the trial judge is to have considered the time already served pursuant
to the first sentence when passing judgment at the second trial.
The court goes on to say "when the maximum sentence is imposed
at the second trial, this dispels any suggestion that the trial judge
33
gave defendant credit for the punishment he had already received.1
A situation that the North Carolina court has not yet had to
face is where the sentence imposed at the second trial does not
exceed the maximum legal sentence, but when added to the time
served under the vacated judgment the total is more than the maximum legal sentence. In this situation the court will be faced with
two alternatives. It may allow credit for the total time served under
the vacated judgment or it may allow credit only for the time in
excess of the maximum legal sentence. Following the rationale of
Weaver it would seem mandatory that full credit be given, since
it is evident that the trial judge did not consider this time when
passing sentence at the second trial.
Another possible solution is to treat this type of sentence as any
other sentence in excess of the legal maximum. The rule regarding
excessive sentences was stated in State v. Austin :4

" See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2900.1 (1949); In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302,
240 P.2d 596 (1952). But cf., State ex reL Nelson v. Ellsworth, 141 Mont.
78, 375 P.2d 316 (1962), where the court interpreted a Montana law as
forbidding
credit in certain situations.
30Inre Wilson, 202 Cal. 341, 260 Pac. 542 (1927) ; Little v. Wainwright,
161 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1964); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 445, 108
N.E.2d 922 (1962); Ex parte Williams, 63 Okla. Crim. 395, 72 P.2d 904
(1938); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
" Millard v. Skillman, 341 Mich. 461, 67 N.W.2d 708 (1951).
82 State v. Goff, 264 N.C. 563, 142 S.E.2d 142 (1965).
11264 N.C. at 686, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
*'241 N.C. 548, 85 S.E.2d 924 (1955).
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It is the general rule in this jurisdiction that where a defendant
has been properly convicted but given a sentence in excess of that
authorized by law and comes to this court pursuant to a petition
for a writ of certiorariin a habeas corpus proceeding, when such
defendant has not served as long under the sentence as he might
have been legally imprisoned, we vacate the improper sentence
and remand for proper sentence.3,
As noted previously, the North Carolina court expressly refused
to grant credit for the time served in county jail prior to the time
the first sentence was vacated and the second judgment pronounced.
The court stated that "during this period, while in custody in default of bond, defendant was not serving a sentence as punishment
for the conduct charged in the bill of indictment." 6 Research indicates that only a small minority of jurisdictions grant credit in this
situation.3 7 The view expressed by the North Carolina court has
rarely been challenged by appeal or by collateral attack.
In respect to the credit problem in general, it would seem that
Weaver is at least an affirmative step in the right direction. To
deny a prisoner credit in this situation is to penalize him unduly for
exercising his post-conviction remedies; furthermore, it would seem
to constitute an unnecessary-if not unconstitutional-restraint on
the exercise of such rights."8 It is hoped that the court will extend
this decision to instances-not factually in accord with Weaverwhere the defendant does not receive the maximum sentence upon
the second conviction. One means of assuring that such credit is
granted would be to have the court remanding the case to specify
that the trial court is expressly to give the credit. This would have
the desirable effect of removing any idea from the prisoner's mind, 9
and the minds of the public in general, that time served and good
-1241 N.C. at 550, 85 S.E.2d at 926. (Emphasis added.)
264 at 687, 142 S.E.2d at 637.
See Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1957). The court gave
credit for the time the defendant was confined in jail awaiting a new trial.
He had been awarded a new trial because the sentence imposed at the
previous trial was excessive. Cf. Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 392 P.2d
542 (1964). But see State v. Boles, 148 W.Va. 802, 137 S.E.2d 418 (1964)
(court may at its discretion grant credit from the time first confined).
" See Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965); 1965 DUKE
L.J. 395.
'This would tend to make the prisoner more receptive to prison programs aimed at helping him become a useful citizen. See Tisdel, Rehabilitation-Colossal Failure, 7 CAN. B.J. 142 (1964) which points out the failure
of the penal systems to rehabilitate and the urgent need for changes to
meet this objective.
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behavior credits earned would not be tossed into a bottomless pit
under the guise of some harsh and highly technical legal theory.
This approach has been adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. In Stonebreaker v. Smyth" the court expressly provided
that time served under a vacated judgment should be credited to a
41
second sentence if the defendant were convicted at the second trial.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed this procedure
in analogous situations. In a case involving an excessive sentence
the North Carolina court remanded with the instruction that the
trial court so condition its sentence upon the second sentencing to
allow credit for the time already served.4 2 In another case the
defendant had been found guilty on more than one count and had
been given consecutive sentences. After having served some time
under the first sentence, that conviction was reversed, and the court
remanded with directions to allow the time served toward that sentence to count against the second sentence.43
In Weaver, North Carolina took a giant step in dispensing with
the subtle legal technicalities heretofore utilized to deny credit for
time served under a vacated judgment. By analogy, it could be
argued that the court should grant credit for all confinement following the first conviction, be it in prison or in county jail. In Weaver,
the defendant was confined in jail for a period of two months
because of failure to give bond. 44 The Florida court, granting credit
under similar circumstances, stated: "It is not petitioner's fault that
the states criminal system failed to judge him guilty and sentence
him properly in an uninterrupted operation. .

.

. It is only fair to

give petitioner full credit for all time he has been in official custody
since the time of his first commitment ....
BILLY

R. BARR

"187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).

41 In this case the defendant had served fifteen years under a sentence
imposed for a conviction of armed robbery. Because he had been denied

counsel at the first trial, he was awarded a new trial.
It seems that in other jurisdictions as in North Carolina this problem
has arisen primarily where the right to counsel has been denied in a previous
trial, but the same principle holds true in other situations.

State v. Hollars, 260 N.C. 195, 132 S.E.2d 325 (1963).
Potter v. State, 263 N.C. 114, 139 S.E.2d 4 (1964).
"264 N.C. at 683, 142 S.E.2d at 635.
"Tilghman v. Culver, 99 So. 2d 282, 285 (Fla. 1957).
4'

4"
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International Law-Expropriation-The Act of State Doctrine
The recent case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr' is the
decision on remand of the now famous case Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino.2 The litigation arose out of the Cuban expropriation
of American properties in 1960. Farr, Whitlock and Company, a
New York sugar brokerage firm, had executed a contract to buy
sugar from Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de Cuba,
which was largely owned and controlled by private American capital. 8 Before loading could be completed, Premier Fidel Castro confiscated the properties of twenty-six corporations owned by American
interests, including C.A.V.4 In order to obtain the sugar, Farr,
Whitlock had to negotiate another contract with the Cuban Government. Pursuant to this second contract, the sugar was sold in
Morocco. Later, Farr, Whitlock refused to deliver either the necessary bills of lading or the proceeds of the sale to the agent of the
Cuban government. The Cuban bank then brought suit in a Federal
district court against Farr, Whitlock for conversion and against
Sabbatino, temporary receiver of C.A.V. for injunctive relief.
The outcome depended upon whether the so-called "act of state
doctrine" was to be applied. This doctrine, stated simply, means
that the courts of one nation will not sit in judgment on the acts of
other nations committed within their own boundaries.' Thus if the
doctrine were applied, Cuba would succeed because the court could
not question the validity of a title obtained by an act of state. If
the doctrine were not applied, the court could decide all aspects of
the case on its merits, including a determination of the validity of
the expropriation in the context of international law.
The district court' held that the doctrine was inapplicable be1343 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
' Farr, Whitlock & Co. will hereinafter be referred to as Farr, Whitlock.
Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de Cuba will be referred to as
C.A.V.
'376 U.S. at 401-2 n.3-4. The expropriation decree, Cuban Public Law
No. 851, provided a highly illusory method of compensation whereby for
thirty years the United States would have to buy more sugar from Cuba
at higher prices than any previous period in history. For a full English
translation, see 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 822 (1961).
J. INT'L L. 827 (1959).
'Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am.
'Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
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cause the taking was confiscatory and thus a violation of international law. 7 Since the taking was unlawful, title had never parted
C.A.V. nor vested in the Cuban Government. The court of appeals
affirmed.8 On appeal to the Supreme Court the case was reversed
and remanded in a eight-to-one decision with a vigorous dissent by
Mr. Justice White.' The act of state doctrine was applied in a
broad manner. The mandate to the lower court specified that proceedings were to be entered consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision, but leave was given to decide other litigable issues if they
should arise.Y0
After the Supreme Court's decree and before disposition of the
case on remand, Senators Hickenlooper and Sparkman successfully
sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964.
The Hickenlooper Amendment precludes American courts from applying the act of state doctrine in cases arising out of foreign expropriations of American property from January 1, -1959 to January 1,
1966. The courts are to decide the cases on their merits, according
to principles of international law. But if the President advises the
court that such determination would hamper the foreign policy interests of the United States or if the taking in question does not violate
international law, the doctrine will be applied and there will be no
trial on the merits.
7

The nationalization was said to be in violation of international law
because it was retaliatory, discriminatory, and without adequate compensation. 193 F. Supp. at 384-85.
8307 F.2d 845 (1962).
° 376 U.S. 398, 439.
10Ibid.
"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1008, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2). The amendment reads as follows:
No court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a
foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959,
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international
law. Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in
any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law ... or (2) in any case with respect to which the President
determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in
that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with
the court or (3) in any case in which the proceedings are commenced
after January 1, 1966,
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The district court, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,2 held
that the general mandate from the Supreme Court was inapplicable
because of the intervening act of Congress. It applied the amendment retroactively and held that it was bound by the previous decision of the court of appeals that the expropriation violated
international law. 13 However, before dismissing the complaint, the
court felt that the "Executive Arm" should have sixty days-or
longer if necessary-to make a determination whether the act of
4
state doctrine should be applied in the interest of foreign policy.Y
In order to understand the importance and implications of Farr
more fully, it is necessary to consider the act of state doctrine as
traditionally applied. Probably the original reason for its existence
was the principle of absolute sovereignty of nations." In the
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,'6 Chief Justice Marshall stated that
"the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute,"'" and any exceptions "to the full and
complete power of a nation must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself." 8 It would seem that Chief Justice Fuller, in Under2243 F. Supp. 957. Even before the decision reached the Supreme
Court, Sabbatino was released as temporary receiver of C.A.V. On remand,
the case title was amended so as to eliminate him from the proceedings.
1 243 F. Supp. at 979-81.

" On September 29, 1965, Robert M. Morganthau, United States attorney,
in a letter to Fredrick van Pelt Bryan, district judge, stated that "no
determination has been made that application of the act of state doctrine
is required in this case by the foreign policy interests of the United States."
Society of International Law, Letter to Members, Sept.-Oct. 1965, p. 3.
On November 15, 1965, Judge Bryan, in a memorandum opinion, entered
final decree in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farrbased upon the Morganthau
letter. It was said that since the Executive Branch had no objections to
trying the case on its merits, Cuba's complaint was dismissed and the
opinion of the court of appeals in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
307 F.2d 845 (1962), reinstated. 4 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1209
(1965).
1 See Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the Uzited
States Rejects a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine, 32 FORDHAm L. REv. 631, 633 (1964).
Reeves praises the Sabbatino decision. For a criticism, see Stevenson, The
State Department and Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors Are by Victories Undone,"
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964).
1

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

"'Id.at 135.
"8 Ibid. As stated by House, The Law Gone Awry: Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres,37 CALIF. L. REV. 38, 40 (1949), the act of state doctrine
arises out of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The two are distinguishable in that the act of state doctrine is open as a defense to private litigants
who may have obtained expropriated property from the acting government.
In contrast, the defense of sovereign immunity is not open to the private
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hill v. Hernandez,"9 had these considerations in mind, when in an

often-quoted dictum, he stated that "every sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory."20
Other reasons for its existence are variants of each other and
are not mutually exclusive. They are separation of powers and the
self-imposed doctrine of judicial restraint known as "political questions." The Supreme Court in Oetjen, v. Central Leather Co."
stated that "foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the political'Departments of our government, and-is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." 22 Because of the importance of foreign relations,
the courts have felt that the national interest requires the United
States "to speak with one voice" 23 in this area. As a result, foreign
affairs has been removed from the scope of judicial review and
placed in the realm of "political questions." Consequently, the President has a free and unrestrained hand to carry on foreign relations
without fear of adverse decisions by the courts.24
The actions of the President in the field of foreign affairs have
had an important, though indirect, effect upon the traditional act
of state doctrine.' For example, in American Banana Co. v. United
litigant and can only be used by the sovereign or one of its agents who
has acted in his official capacity. See Zander, supra note 6, at 826, 827;
Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234, 237 n.21 (1960) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J.
108, 113 (1947); 75 HARV. L. Rv.1607 (1962).
" 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
" Id.at 252. It is important to note that the case was actually decided
on the doctrine of "sovereign immunity," not on the act of state doctrine.
The act of state dictum by Chief Justice Fuller was not essential to the
outcome of the case. This ispointed out inthe article by Zander, supra
note 6, at 837. For other earlier decisions containing the act of state
language see Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247 (1796); Hatch v.
Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (1876); Luther v.Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
21246 U.S. 297 (1918).
"Id. at 302. See Banco de Espana v.Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438 (2d Cir. 1940); Holzer v.Deutsche Reichbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y.
474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938); Dougherty v.Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 266
N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Wulfson v. Russian Socialist Federated
Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
"Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 281 (1962) (dissenting opinion). See
also 13 MERCER L. REV. 370, 393 (1962).

" RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41,

comment a at 3 (1964) (Report on Revised §§ 41-44).
" Itappears that the United States government had sometimes intervened
but solely on the question of sovereign immunity and not on the application
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Fruit
and Ricaud v. American Metal Co.1 7 the Court took
judicial notice of the State Department's recognition of the foreign
governments that had committed the alleged illegal acts. As a result,
the act of state doctrine was applied to deny recovery.28 Apparently,
the courts presumed that a trial on the merits would result in the
embarrassment of the President in his conduct of foreign affairs.2 9
Certain inroads have been made into the act of state doctrine
as traditionally applied. One such inroad was the "Bernstein exception."8 " After a maze of litigation, plaintiff Bernstein, whose vessels
had been confiscated by Nazi Germany, was allowed recovery against
the defendant Dutch-American corporation, which had purchased
the property from Germany. The court of appeals refused to apply
the doctrine, relying on a State Department Release81 which declared
that the President had no objections to the German expropriations
cases being fully litigated in American courts. The court held that
the case could be tried on its merits and that Bernstein could recover.
of the act of state doctrine. See National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945);

P. & E. Shipping Co. v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 307

F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962). On the governmental intervention in the sovereign
immunity cases see

HACKWORTH,

2 DIGEST

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1941);

40 COLUmn. L. REv. 453 (1940).
00213 U.S. 347 (1909).
27246 U.S. 304 (1918). It would appear that this decision was the first
one actually decided on the act of state doctrine. See Zander, supra note 6.
" 213 U.S. at 353; 246 U.S. at 309. But in at least one case, Salimoff &
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933), it appears
that the act of state doctrine was applied even though the acting nation
(Soviet Russia) was not recognized by the United States. But see A/S
Meriland & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1947).
See generally WHITEMAN, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 69-70
(1963).
20 See 110 CONG. REC. 19546 (1964)
(remarks of Senator Hickenlooper).
00 See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anoyme, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), where Bernstein was not
allowed recovery through a reluctant application of the doctrine by Judge
Learned Hand. Subsequently, Bernstein brought a totally different action
as Bernstein v. N.V. Nedelandsche- Amerikaansche Stoomvart- Maatshappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). He recovered in the latter action, but the act
of state doctrine was not at issue. On remand, the defendant interposed
the doctrine in its defense, and the case came to the court of appeals a
second time. This time the court amended its prior decision and did not
apply the doctrine. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The court relied upon the
State Department Release, note 31 infra.
" Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Secretary of
State, to Bennett, House, & Counts, Counsel for plaintiff, in 20 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 592 (1949). "[This] is to relieve American courts from any restraint
upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts
of Nazi officials."
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The State Department later apparently adopted the Bernstein release as its permanent policy in the famous Tate letter. a2 The
Department announced that it would suggest applications of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity where the foreign taking was only
governmental in nature. If the taking were confiscatory or commercial in nature, the Department would suggest that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity not be applied. Presumably, the BernsteinTate approach governed prior to Sabbatino.83 However, the full
effect of Bernstein was never known since it was not appealed to the
Supreme Court because of an approved settlement. 4
The next real test of the doctrine came with Sabbatino. The
court of appeals had found Bernstein controlling because in Sabbatino, as in Bernstein, the State Department had condemned85 the
expropriations and indicated its willingness to have the cases decided
on their merits.30 The Supreme Court, however, followed the
earlier decisions, holding that although the act of state doctrine
was not required by the Constitution, it did have "constitutional
underpinnings." 7 Thus, it apparently disregarded Bernstein3 s and
possibly obscured the significance of the Tate letter.3 9 The Court
also felt that judicial review by American courts of the acts of
other states might "embarrass" the Executive Branch in its conduct
of foreign affairs and "would hinder rather than further this coun" Letter From Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the State Depart-

ment, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, in 26

DEP'T STATE

BULL. 984 (1952). It is to be noted that the Bernstein Release dealt only
with the act of state doctrine, and the Tate letter spoke only in terms of
sovereign immunity. However, they were very related in that they were
authored by the same person and because their intention was the same, i.e.,
to give the wronged party his day in court. See Folsom, The Sabbatino Case:
Rule of Law or Rule of "No Law"?, 51 A.B.A.J. 725, 728 (1965); 32 U.
CINc. L. REv. 112, 114 (1963). For discussion of Tate letter see New York
& Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
" Kane v. National Institute of Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116
(Cir. Ct. 1961).
"N.Y. Timies, March 18, 1955, p. 55, col. 2.
"43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1960). The State Department's condemnation of the expropriation said that it was "in its essence discriminatory,
confiscatory and arbitrary."
307 F.2d 845, 858 (1962).
" 376 U.S. at 423.
8 See Folsom, supra note 32, at 727. The Court stated that it took no
position in respect to Bernstein. 376 U.S. at 420. However the preceding
commentary infers that Bernstein was overruled.
" Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
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try's pursuit of goals for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole.""0
Farr presented the first confrontation of the traditional act of
state doctrine, as enunciated by Sabbatino, and the Hickenlooper
Amendment, and as previously stated the district court found the
amendment applicable to all pending cases arising out of the Cuban
expropriation, including the remanded Sabbatino case itself.4" What
is more important, it found the amendment to be constitutional,
stating that it comes within the congressional power to legislate in
the areas of foreign commerce and foreign affairs.42
The commerce argument seems to be the most convincing. The
court's reasoning was that Congress had the express power, supplemented by the implied power of the "necessary and proper" clause,
to enact the Hickenlooper Amendment.13 This theory has been
voiced by some authorities. 44 But the amendment cannot violate
the "constitutional underpinnings" of Sabbati-no, which are said to
be the proper distribution of functions between the political and
judiciary branches in regard to foreign affairs.4 5 The Farr court
had no doubts that Congress could legislate in the field of foreign
affairs because Sabbatino40 and Oetien4 7 had expressly stated that
it had the power to do so. However, the question still exists whether
Congress can go so far as to realign these "proper functions." The
amendment does not convey a new area of jurisdiction upon the
courts because they have had jurisdiction from the beginning.4s
They simply have failed to exercise it properly where acts of foreign
,0376 U.S. at 416-23.
"Id. at 423.
"243 F. Supp at 964-71. The outcome of some forty cases will depend
upon the final decree in Farr. The court's retroactive application of the
amendment is open to question. Senator Hickenlooper stated dearly and
unequivocally that the amendment did not apply to Sabbatino. He said "the
amendment will lead U.S. courts to a different result from that reached by
the majority . . . in Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino. It does not
change the Court's decision in that case. . . ." 110 CONG. REc. 19559 (1964).
The court wrote this off as a casual statement made in floor debate. However, the statement was made in a series of carefully drawn questions and
answers by Senator Hickenlooper himself. There was no debate.
48243 F. Supp. at 972-76. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
"FAN, THE AFTERMATH OF SABBATINO 98-101 (1965).
"Id. at 38.
"376 U.S. at 423.
47 246 U.S. at 302.
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 specifically states that the judicial power
of federal courts "extends to Controversies ...

between a State, or Citizens

thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
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states were in question. But if the courts do adjudicate, will their
decisions be dictated by the President? Also, has the Congress in
passing the amendment, impinged upon the function of the Executive? If the President could be embarrassed in his foreign policy
by an adverse decision of the court as stated in Sabbatino, could
the amendment not embarrass him equally so? It would seem that
the amendment, in effect, returns us to the Bernstei4 exception,
which apparently was rejected in Sabbatino. Does this mean that
the amendment must fall also? These questions are open ones that
only the Supreme Court can answer. The constitutional question
is even more important now than when the Farr opinion was rendered because Congress has made the Hickenlooper Amendment
permanent law.49
Assuming the amendment to be constitutional, what are its effects
upon international law? First, it does not destroy the act of state
doctrine. It modifies the doctrine to achieve a "reversal of presumptions."5 No longer will the courts have to presume that a decision
on the merits regarding a foreign act of state will embarrass the
President in the conduct of his foreign policy. Now the presumption is that such decisions will not embarrass him. Of course, the
latter presumption can be rebutted by the President's suggestion
that a full determination would hinder the foreign policy interests
of the United States.51
Another effect of the amendment should be a discouragement
of foreign confiscations. 52 At the same time, it should encourage
foreign investment.5 3 The Hickenlooper Amendment does not keep
foreign governments from confiscating American property; however, it does prevent confiscating governments from successfully
suing otherwise remediless defendants who refuse to pay them what
54
is not rightfully theirs.
Probably the most important result of Farr and its supporting
"Pub. L. No. 171, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(d) (4) (Sept. 11, 1965).
The House favored a one-year extension of the amendment. See H.R. REP.
No. 321, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 31-32 (1965). The Senate version was to make
the amendment permanent, S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
Finally the Senate version was enacted, deleting the last phrase of the
amendment, thus making it permanent.
'0See 110 CONG. REc. 19557 (1964).
11
78 Stat. 1008, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2); See note 11 supra.
"2Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
See 110 CONG. REc. 19557 (1964).
,Ibid.
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Hickenlooper Amendment should be their effect on the growth of
international law. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino felt that a review of the Cuban expropriation would retard the growth of international law. "5 However, the reverse would seem to be true.5"
Since international courts have jurisdiction only when the parties
are consenting nations, many disputes between foreign states and
citizens of the United States would, through application of the act of
state doctrine, not be litigable at all. Farr, if followed should help
to fill this gap in the settlement of transnational disputes. As Mr.
Justice White pointed out in his Sabbatino dissent, our courts, under
the majority ruling, would have to validate automatically, discriminatory and unlawful expropriations.57 Such acts, if they are also
permitted by the law of another nation, would then tend to become
a part of accepted international law. Needless to say, if peace and
order are to be attained through world law, there can be no place
for lawless acts that detract from the stature of international law.
International law has long been declared part of the law of the
United States. " ' It would seem, therefore, that our American courts
should follow the precedents of the courts of other nations and
decide these disputes, even though they may involve acts of foreign
states, in the context of international law.59 Farr and the Hickenlooper Amendment should achieve this result.
TommY W. JARRETT

Labor Law-Application of Antitrust Law to Union ActivitiesExtra-Unit Agreements
In an effort to avoid the concentration of economic power, two
national policies have been promulgated that, ironically, result in
apparent conflict. The antitrust policy, intended to distribute power
U.S. at 433.
376
Folsom, supra note 32, at 727.
U.S. at 439.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895).
80

87376

"The courts of several countries have not hesitated to declare foreign
expropriations unlawful. See e.g., Anglo-Italian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co.,

[1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Civ. Ct. Rome); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,
[1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct.). It is also especially important

to note that the Permanent Arbitration Court in Norvay v. United States,
1 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 325 (1933), has declared discriminatory
takings to be in violation of international law.
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among entrepreneurs, establishes prohibitions on the restraint of
competition, while the national labor policy, on the other hand, exempts most union activity from those prohibitions in an attempt to
balance the powers of entrepreneurs and workers. The necessity of
resolving this conflict of attitudes toward competition is perhaps
most pressing when the courts are asked to apply the antitrust laws
to labor unions.' Recently the United States Supreme Court was
faced with that necessity in two cases. In UMW v. Pennington2 Mr.
Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court but speaking for
only three members, said that while it is clear that unions can bargain with multiemployer groups,' the union "forfeits its exemption
from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed
with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other
bargaining units."4 But in the companion case, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,' the union acted alone and
not at the request of an employer group, and Mr. Justice White
found that an attempt to gain a marketing-hours restriction is "within the protection of the national labor policy and . . . therefore
exempt from the Sherman Act," 6 since such a restriction, he decided,
is intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions.
In Pennington a long controversy concerning a solution to the
problem of overproduction in the coal industry had culminated in
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 in which
'For an analysis of this conflict see Winter, Collective Bargaining and
Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities,
73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). Professor Winter takes the position that collective
bargaining creates anticompetitive incentives and that there are no general
principles that will reconcile the conflict. For the position that no conflict
exists between the two policies see Frank, The Myth of the Conflict between
Antitrust Law and Labor Law in the Application of Antitrzst Law to Union
Activity, 69 DIcK. L. REv. 1 (1964).
2381 U.S. 657 (1965).
'Approximately four million employees are now governed by collective bargaining agreements signed by unions with thousands of employer associations. At the time of the debates on the Taft-Hartley
amendments, proposals were made to limit or outlaw multi-employer
bargaining. These proposals failed of enactment. They were met
with a storm of protest that their adoption would tend to weaken and
not strengthen the process of collective bargaining and would conflict with the national labor policy of promoting industrial peace
through effective collective bargaining.
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957).
'381 U.S. at 665 (1965).
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Old. at 689-90.
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the United Mine Workers gave up its opposition to automation and
in return for the resulting higher wages agreed to enforce those
wages against the smaller companies without regard for their ability
to pay.7 The trustees of the UMW retirement fund brought suit
against Phillips Brothers Coal Company, a small operator who had
entered the agreement only under union pressure," to recover royalties due under the agreement. Phillips cross-claimed, alleging that
the union and trustees had conspired with the large operators to
force the smaller companies out of business in violation of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.' The union answered affirmatively
that under section 6 of the Clayton Act 0 it is exempt from the
Sherman Act provisions." On appeal from a verdict against the
union,' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an
exemption from the antitrust laws "does not exist ... where a labor

union combines with a nonlabor organization to restrain competition
in, or to monopolize the marketing of, goods in interstate com3
merce."'
Also under union pressure, Jewel Tea Company entered an agreeAdam, Technology and Productivity in Bitumihwus Coal, 1949-1959, 84
LABOR REV. 1081 (1961). The author reviews the general background of the industry and the changes after the agreement.
Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 1963).
o Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
MONTHLY

States ... is declared to be illegal .... Every person who shall make

any [such] contract or engage in any [such] combination or conspiracy

. . .

shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....

Section 2 provides:

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or

combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize

any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine .. .or by imprisonment
6 .. or by both....
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . .
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
1'Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1963).
The charge against the trustees was dismissed by the trial court.
Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1963).
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ment whereby it was to sell meat in Chicago only between nine a.m.
and six p.m. The same agreement had at first been resisted and
then accepted by a multi-employer group of 9,000 other Chicago
meat retailers. Jewel alleged a conspiracy between the union and
the trade association in violation of the Sherman Act but the trial
court, finding no evidence of such a conspiracy, held that the union
had acted in its own interests and was thus entitled to the labor
exemption. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, relying on traditional antitrust law, reversed. The court held
that the agreement between the union and the trade association was
in itself a conspiracy,14 that the determination of marketing hours
is a proprietary function, and that therefore a conspiracy designed
to restrict that function "is a violation of the Sherman Act, and not
entitled to the exemption therefrom. . ... ,1
The history of the Court's efforts to reconcile this conflict of
policies is marked by confusion and uncertainty resulting first from
a lack of legislative guidelines and then from a refusal to recognize
the guidelines once they were established. Thus, in the pre-Clayton
Act era the Court, relying on the broad language of the antitrust
laws and the failure of Congress to include a proposed labor exemp6
tion, decided in Loewe v. Lawlor"
that a secondary boycott was
susceptible to a suit for treble damages because the Sherman Act
"provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal.' 1 7 Two years later the Court relied on
this construction to uphold an injunction against a "we don't patron8
ize" list published in a union paper.'
But in 1914 the congressional response was that human labor is
not a commodity" and that certain enumerated activities are not to
be considered a violation of the federal laws.20 Such language should
"' Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers, Inc., 331 F.2d 547, 551
(7th5 Cir. 1964).
'1 Id. at 549.
10208
U.S. 274 (1908).
1
17
Id. at 301.
'8 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
' Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
"'No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States... in any case between an employer and employees,
or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury. ...
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any
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have been a more than adequate guideline, but seven years later in
Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering"' the Court circumvented the
mandate. There the Court construed away the meaning of the
statute and enjoined a secondary boycott by restricting section 6
to disputes between employers and their immediate employees and
by emphasizing the words "lawfully" and "peacefully" in section
20 to infer that the statute dealt only with lawful conduct. Then
in Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW 2 2 the Court found a way to outlaw
primary activity, saying
[W]hen the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the
supply entering. .. interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate23markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust
Act.

24
Such restrictive constructions of the Clayton Act were frequent
until Congress reacted again in 1932 by passing the Norris-La-

Guardia Act. 20 The committee reports preceding enactment show a
person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating
any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or
labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such
person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading
any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so
to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person
engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things
of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for
lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto;
nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or
held to be violations of any law of the United States.
§ 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
Clayton Act
21254 U.S. 443 (1920).
22268 U.S. 295 (1925).
2
8Id.at 310.
"4See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n,
274 U.S. 37 (1927); Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925);
United Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265
U.S. 457 (1924); National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States,
263 U.S. 403 (1923); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922);
Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D.
Pa. 1929).
,"47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Section 13(c) of
the act provides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
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clear intent to proscribe such judicial toying with the national labor
policy.2 6 The Court seemed to recognize this and began to give the
act full effect. For example, the restrictive definition of a labor dispute in Duplex appeared to have been effectively repudiated in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.17 A year later, in a case
involving a violent sit-down strike, the Court declared that the
elimination of wage competition is the object of labor unions but
that this is not the kind of restraint on competition that the Sherman
28
Act was intended to curtail.

Finally in 1941, thirty-three years after Lawlor and twenty-seven
years after the Clayton Act, the Court managed in United States v.
Hutcheson2 9 to give full effect to the labor policy by adopting a
"harmonizing text"3 concept and saying
If the facts laid in the indictment come within the conduct
enumerated in § 20 of the Clayton Act they do not constitute a
crime within the general terms of the Sherman Law because of
the explicit command of that section that such conduct shall not
be "considered or held to be violations of any law of the United
States. ' ,a-

But the decision in Hutcheson was not quite as far reaching as it
might otherwise have been, for the Court also said
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not
to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or
unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfrepresentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, chang-

ing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee.
47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958).
2 "That there have been abuses of judicial power in granting injunctions
in labor disputes is hardly open to discussion. The use of the injunction in
such disputes has been growing by leaps and bounds." S. REP. No. 163, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932). "The purpose of the bill is to protect the rights
of labor in the same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the
Clayton Act, . . . which act, by reason of its construction and application
by the Federal courts, is ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent."
H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
2 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
"8Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503-04 (1940).
29 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
20 "Therefore, whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the
Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and
§ 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing
text31 of
outlawry of labor conduct." Id. at 231.
Id. at 232.
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ishness3 2of the end of which the particular union activities are the
means.
It was this unnecessarily broad dictum that pointed directly to the
problem of combinations between labor and management in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers."3
Although, when the Court reached Allen Bradley, it had refused
the exemption to a group of fishermen because they were considered
entrepreneurs3 4 and had struck down a state court injunction against
35
picketing bakeries to organize independent peddlers, it had not,
since the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia, directly faced the problem of unions and employers conspiring against other employers.3 "
In Allen Bradley the union combined with manufacturers of electrical equipment and the contractors who installed it to close the New
York City market to all outside manufacturers. The result of this
arrangement was that prices and wages soared to the benefit of all
of the conspirators and to the detriment of everyone else. Presented
with this hard case, the Court made bad law, perhaps, by saying, in
language that was again too broad,
[W]hen the unions participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate all competition
among themselves and to prevent all competition from others,
the exemptions of
a situation was created not included within
37
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
The Court continued, "Our holding means that the same labor union
activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act,
dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with
business groups."88
Since the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia, then, the history of
the decisions may be viewed as an effort to give full effect to the
labor exemption prescribed by Congress. This effort reached its
peak in Hutcheson and receded in Allen Bradley in which the Court
39
created a sweeping exception that has bothered it ever since.
22 Ibid.
" 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
",Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
",Bakery Drivers Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
"lAllen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 807-08 (1945).
7 Id. at 809.
"Id. at 810.
"Since Allen Bradley it has been held that union-employer combinations
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When the Court was faced in Pennington with another flagrant
abuse of union power, two precedents were possibly open to it-the
Allen Bradley approach offered by Mr. Justice Douglas and the
Hutcheson approach offered by Mr. Justice Goldberg.4 0 Significantly, Mr. Justice White rejected both, though he failed to say so
expressly, and chose instead to attempt to balance the conflict between
the two relevant policies. 4 He reasoned that there is nothing in the
national labor policy that permits a union to combine with an employer unit to enforce agreed wage standards against other employers. Quite the contrary, he decided, the labor policy requires the union
to keep itself free to bargain on a unit-by-unit basis.42 On the other
hand, the antitrust policy precludes such an agreement since the
interests of the union would be inextricably bound to those of a
favored employer. 3
If in Pennington Mr. Justice White pointed out what unions
may not do, in Jewel he showed what unions may do. Here he said
that if the subject matter of an agreement is within the realm of
mandatory bargaining, the union is exempt if it unilaterally seeks
such an agreement from one employer, though the same agreement
has been made with other employers.4 4 But the rule was offered
with this caveat: the mere fact that only one employer is involved
does not mean that the antitrust exemption necessarily follows.45
Again, he pointed out that the problem is one of balancing the
relevant policies and that though a mandatory subject of bargaining
weighs heavily on the side of exemption, it is not conclusive.40
to fix prices, Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers
Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946), or to bar competition, United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954), are not within the exemption. Also, it has been held that the union's participation will not provide entrepreneurs with the exemption. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs.
Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949). Accord, Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v.
United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962). But it has also been held that, absent
other evidence of conspiracy, a wage contract is exempt even though it was
made to force an employer out of business. Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958).
" The Hutcheson approach would seem to be feasible if the language
quoted above is treated as dictum and the price control factor in Allent
Bradley is emphasized.
"1381 U.S. at 665.
12 Id. at 666.
"Id. at 668.
"381 U.S. at 689-90.
"Id. at 689.
"Ibid.
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Thus, he decided that this marketing-hours restriction was so intimately related to wages, hours and other conditions of employment
as to fall within the protection of the labor policy.
The two cases when read together, then, seem to stand for the
proposition that the union may not make extra-unit 47 bargaining
agreements even on mandatory subjects, but even when the subject
is not clearly mandatory, the mere existence of a parallel agreement
will not deprive the union of its exemption. From this one limitation on Allen Bradley is readily apparent: the traditional doctrine
of antitrust law, which infers conspiracy without express agreement,
will not be applied in the area of collective bargaining.4 8 Moreover,
it seems clear that the broad language of Hutcheson will not be used
to exempt agreements on nonmandatory subjects.49
However, some problems are not so clearly resolved. For instance, in view of the fact that predatory purpose lurked heavily in
the background of Pennington and did not appear on the surface in
Jewel, did the talk of balancing policies actually reflect at least a
partial return to the wrongful intent doctrine of the Coronado era?' °
Indeed, since the union intent in Pennington was in fact anticompetitive, was Mr. Justice White's emphasis on extra-unit agreements
only dictum, or will the Court actually hold all such agreements
antitrust violations in spite of their purpose? 5 Further, may unions
continue to rely on industry leaders to set bargaining patterns for
the smaller companies? Is it true, as Mr. Justice Goldberg suggested, that mention of competitive disadvantage will be treated as
evidence of conspiracy?5 2
In seeking answers to these problems and others, it must be kept
in mind that the Court was split three-three-three in both cases.53
'"Extra-unit bargaining occurs when the union agrees "with one set of
employers to impose a certain wage scale [or other terms] on other bargain381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
ing units." UMW v. Pennington,
,Id. at 665 n.2. Contra, id. at 673 (concurring opinion).
,0 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
"Id. at 720 (separate opinion).
01

Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the Antitrust Laws,

32 U. CHI. L. REv. 659, 725 n.228 (1965). Professor Meltzer pointed out
that Mr. Justice White failed to take note of some evidence of extra-unit
bargaining in Jewel. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 839, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
" Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 714-16
(1965) (separate opinion).
"In both cases the opinion labeled as that of the Court involved only
three members. Justices Douglas, Black and Clark chose to rely on Allen
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It is this fact that precludes any definite answers without further
litigation or new legislation. In the meantime, the most that can be
said is that complete reliance on either Hutcheson or Allen Bradley
has been renounced by the majority of the Court.
MARTIN

N.

ERWIN

Labor Law-Pre-Election v. Post-Election Relief Under the LMRDA
When Raymond Harvey sought to nominate himself for office
in the National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, he discovered that he was unable to do so since he was ineligible to be
a candidate. The union bylaws provided that a member could nominate only himself for office, and the union's constitution provided
that no one was eligible for nomination to a full-time union office
unless he had been a union member for five years and had served
at least 180 days in each of two of the three preceding years on
ships with union contracts. Harvey had not met the service requirement. 1 He sued the union president, Jesse Calhoon, to enjoin the
election, alleging violations of Title I of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. This Title guarantees equal
rights to all union members to nominate candidates2 and allows any
member whose rights are violated to bring a pre-election suit in a
federal district court for a remedy.3
The question presented to the United States Supreme Court in
Calhoon v. Harvey4 was whether plaintiff Harvey's rights under
Bradley, concurring in Pennington and dissenting in Jewel. In a separate
opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, concurred in both cases but dissented from the extra-unit bargaining rule.
This separate opinion raised many of the important problems inherent in
the opinion of the Court. Its basic position is that Mr. Justice White has
ignored the fundamental realities of collective bargaining and established
barriers to negotiation which will frustrate the congressional intent to promote labor peace and stability.
'Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486, 487 (2d Cir. 1963).
2 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 101(a) (1), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §
411(a) (1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA] provides:
Equal Rights.-Every member of a labor organization shall have
equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organizations, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution
and bylaws.
LMRDA § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1965).
'379 U.S. 134 (1964).
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Title I had been violated or whether his rights under Title IV
had been violated. Title IV provides that every union member in
good standing is eligible "to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) . . . "I

and allows only a post-election remedy by way of petition to the
Secretary of Labor who may direct a new election.'
The district court had dismissed the complaint, holding that it
did not have jurisdiction since a Title I violation was not alleged.7
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations did indicate a Title I violation.8 The Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit, accepting the contention of defendant Calhoon that the district court was correct in refusing to hear the case.
The Court refused to consider Title IV violations when determining if Title I had been violated, but discussed the provisions
of Title IV in clarifying its decision to deny relief under Title I.
In concurring, Mr. Justice Stewart accepted the possibility that a
Title IV violation might also violate Title I, rejecting the majority's
refusal to consider this." Mr. Justice Douglas dissented," adopting the opinion of the Second Circuit that the restrictions in this
case were a violation of Title I.
Section 101 (a) (1), part of labor's "bill of rights,"'1 2 guarantees
union members equal rights and privileges to nominate candidates
for union office subject to reasonable rules in the union's constitution and bylaws.'" Section 102 allows any person whose rights
secured under Title I have been infringed to bring an action for
appropriate civil relief (including injunctions) in a United States
district court.' 4 This remedy, unlike that provided in Title IV, 5 is
'LMRDA § 401(e), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1965).
'LMRDA § 402(a), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1965).
Harvey v. Calhoon, 221 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
s324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963).
° 379 U.S. at 139-40.
"Old. at 143.
1

Id. at 141.
This provision was an amendment to the original Kennedy-Ervin bill.
105 CONG. REc. 6475 (1959). Proposed by Senator McClellan, it was
amended by Senator Kuchel to provide the right of union members to sue
in federal courts. 105 CONG. REc. 6719-20 (1959). (Senator McClellan's
amendment had provided for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor.) For
a discussion of the legislative history of the act, including Title I, see Mc'

(1964).
Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) (1965).
Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1965).

ADAM s, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION
1173
1,73
U

LMRDA § 403, 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1965).
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not exclusive. Section 103 specifically preserves existing rights under
state and federal law.'"
An examination of Title IV clarifies the distinction between a
right to nominate and a right to be a candidate. Section 401(e)
provides that a union member's right to candidacy is "subject to...
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed."'1 Relief for violations of this right is provided by appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Exhaustion of internal union remedies or pursuit of these remedies
without a final decision within three months is a prerequisite to
this relief. Once this exhaustion requirement is met, the complaining union member may petition the Secretary, who must determine
if the restrictions on candidacy are not "reasonable" or not "uniIf he so finds, he may sue to have the election
formly imposed."'
invalidated. In section 403 this procedure is declared to be exclusive.' 9
An effective distinction has been drawn between offenses that
violate Title I, thus justifying pre-election relief, and offenses that
violate Title IV, justifying only post-election relief. The Senate
debate on Title I indicated this:
Mr. KUCHEL. I do not believe that in any fashion the equal
rights section touches what the provisions of the [union's] constitution or bylaws might be with respect to the right to run for
office.
In that connection, I should like to ask the author of the bill
[Mr. Kennedy] ... if he can shed any light on what may be in
the bill with respect to that problem.
Mr. KENNEDY. [T]he bill of rights must be read in conjunction with the remainder of the bill. [In Title IV] we find the
following language: (d) In any election . . . every member in
good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold
"73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1965).
'73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1965).
18173 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1965).
1 One court has recognized this exclusiveness by way of dictum:
Title IV of the LMRDA creates the right of candidacy and simultaneously vests but limited jurisdiction to grant redress for its violation. The more general provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. §... 1337 [granting
federal jurisdiction in civil actions under acts of Congress that regulate commerce or protect trade] cannot expand the restricted scope
of jurisdiction conferred by the LMRDA.
Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers Union, 201 F. Supp. 307, 314 (D. Del.
1961), vacated, 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1962).
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office (subject to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)....
So other rights are guaranteed, in addition to the rights
in the bill of rights, and the general constitutional
guaranteed
20
rights.
The court accepted this distinction and held that plaintiffs had
not established a claim for relief, characterizing their complaint as
an attempt to sweep into the ambit of their right to sue in federal
court if they are denied an equal opportunity to nominate candidates under § 101(a) (1), a right to sue of they are not allowed
of his eligibility and
to nominate anyone they choose regardless
21
qualifications under union restrictions.
Error was found in the decision of the Second Circuit, which had
considered the "combined effect of the eligibility requirements and
the restriction to self-nomination. 2
By adopting this interpretation of Title I, the Court supported
a general congressional policy against intervention in union affairs
and refused to encroach upon the authority given the Secretary of
Labor by Title IV. Mr. Justice Black said:
Congress ... decided not to permit individuals to block or delay
union elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of Title
IV. Reliance on the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony
with the general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies. ... 23
The Secretary has discretion not to sue to invalidate every election in which a complaint is filed. The act, by allowing him to
investigate complaints for up to sixty days,24 has discouraged litigation. The Secretary may discover that no violation was committed,
or, as has happened when the violation was clear, the union may
act to remedy it." The investigation is conducted by the Office of
105 CONG. REc. 6720 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
21379 U.S. at 138.
2 d. at 139.
2 Id. at 140.
'LMRDA § 402(b), 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1965).
" Two recent examples illustrate this. On December 29, 1964, the executive board of the International Electrical Workers declared that incumbent
president James B. Carey, Jr., had defeated challenger Paul Jennings by
about 2,000 votes. Jennings appealed the election, and the Secretary of
Labor ordered an investigation that revealed irregularities in the tabulation
of votes. No suit was ever brought since the union immediately declared
Jennings the victor. Facts on File, April 1-7, 1965, p. 1275. In the most
recent United Steelworkers presidential election, challenger I. W. Abel de-
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Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension Reports under authority
delegated by the Secretary. 6 Suit is brought only if the investigation
shows that the violations may have affected the outcome of the
27
election.
If suit is brought, the role of the court is narrow. Section
402(c) of the act limits a court's determination to whether an
election was held within the prescribed time or whether a Title IV
violation may have affected the outcome.2
If a new election is
ordered, the Secretary of Labor must supervise it, in conformity
with union constitution and bylaws, and certify the results.20
Title IV, which leaves most internal matters in the hands of
the union and does not subject the union to civil liability, did not
disturb organized labor as much as the "bill of rights," which was
opposed from its inception."0 In a House committee hearing, George
Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, called Title I
a device by means of which union officials or unions themselves
as entities can be haled before .

.

. the Federal courts and com-

pelled to account for the manner in which its internal affairs are
being conducted.
A basic difficulty, as we see it, is that any effort to write a
detailed, legally enforcible code of internal procedures for all
unions into a Federal law must inevitably end up either in such
feated incumbent David J. McDonald by about 10,000 votes. Here the
Secretary was never called upon. Union tellers investigated 153 complaints,
two thirds of which had been filed by Abel forces. McDonald was unable
to cite a single solid case of fraud or illegal voting procedures, and the
investigators found none. Thus McDonald had no ground on which to
appeal the election. The union had handled its own affairs; litigation was
unnecessary. Business Week, May 1, 1965, pp. 49-50.
"6Riche, Union Election Challenges Under the LMRDA, 88 MONTHLY
LABOR REVIEw 1 (1965).
"7If the Secretary finds no indication that the outcome of an election
had been affected, he is not required to bring suit. Altman v. Wirtz, 56
L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964). This is analogous to the power given to
the General Counsel by the Taft-Hartley Act. Refusal of the General Counsel
to issue a complaint "is final and unappealable." Wellington Mill Div.,
West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590 (4th Cir. 1964).
:' 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1965).
'Ibid. See United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960), in which Mr. Justice Douglas said (concerning a collective bargaining dispute): "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence [as the labor arbitrator] to bear upon
the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed."
Id. at 582. See also Summers, Judicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 405 (1958); Strauss & Willner, Government
Regulation of Local Union Democracy, 4 LAB. LJ. 519 (1953).
" McADAMS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 113-41.
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general terms as to be susceptible of almost any interpretation,
and hence a breeding ground for litigation, or as a strait-jacket
which would inhibit obviously reasonable and proper union practices. 81
But the "bill of rights" remained, and judicial action has now
alleviated many of the fears of organized labor.
The policy of Congress toward labor is implicit in a provision
of Title I that deters union members from bringing suit, relying
instead upon union procedures. Section 101 (a) (4) provides that before a union member may sue for a violation of Title I, he "may be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures within the union
(but not to exceed a four month [as opposed to three months under
Title IV] lapse of time.)""2 When suits were filed before the member had pursued his union remedies for four months, the courts had
to decide if fulfilment of this procedural requirement was (1) necessary to jurisdiction, (2) unnecessary to jurisdiction, or (3) necessary, but waivable in certain circumstances.
An explanation by Senator Kennedy indicated that fulfilment of
this requirement was unnecessary to jurisdiction insofar as the
courts were concerned. He did, however, deem the requirement to
be applicable to union members,3 3 so that a union could discipline a
member for breach of the restriction though it could not prevent
him from bringing suit. 4 In Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
1Hearings Before Joint Subcommittee on Labor-Management Reform
Legislation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1515 (1959). Meany also said: "Every Chairman of a
local union meeting will be acting under shadow of a court suit each time
he makes a ruling on conduct of the meeting." 105 CONG. REc. (Daily
Appendix) 6402 (1959).
a'LMRDA § 101(a) (4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4)
(1965). The four-month period is apparently measured from the time the
appeal is initiated, rather than from the time of the violation, though no
court has clearly stated this. See McCrav v. United Ass'n of journeymen,
341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 1965). For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement see O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue
Under the Landrum-Grijfin Act, 14 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 215 (1965).
"8Nor is the intent or purpose of the provision to invalidate the...
decisions of many years standing which require, or do not require,
the exhaustion of internal remedies prior to court intervention.
For example, the National Labor Relations Board is not prohibited
from entertaining charges by a member against a labor organization
even though 4 months has not elapsed.

105

CONG. REc.

17899 (1959).

" See McCraw v. United Ass'n of journeymen, 341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th
Cir. 1965).
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Artists 5 the Second Circuit concluded that fulfilment of the exhaus-

tion requirement was necessary but waivable since the statute used
the word may instead of must. In this case the Second Circuit
waived the requirement because here the union remedy was uncertain and had not been brought to the plaintiff's attention, the violation was clear and undisputed, and the injury was immediate and
not compensable by damages. 36 Other courts have followed this
result, developing a doctrine of futility by accepting cases if the
union appeal procedures would be utterly useless or unduly complicated. 7
The courts will apparently apply the same rationale when considering the exhaustion requirement of Title IV. Under Title IV
a union member may petition the Secretary for relief after invoking
internal union remedies for three months. In practice the Secretary
has accepted cases in which remedies had not been pursued for the
statutory period.," One district court has indicated that it would
accept a case brought prematurely when appeal within the union
would be futile.39
The specific requirement for exhaustion of remedies and the
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961).
Id. at 81.
8 McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341 F.2d 705, 711 (6th
Cir. 1965) (case heard since time elapsed); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1964) (no appeal was necessary when
it "would be a futility") ; Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 321
F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 1963) (hearing denied until internal appeal attempted); Burris v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277
(W.D.N.C. 1963). In the latter case, the court accepted jurisdiction since
appeal was impractical because the discharged union member would have
to protest his discharge and be reinstated before he could begin his appeal.
Id. at 280. A federal district court in California has required exhaustion
even if futile. Smith v. General Truck Drivers Union, 181 F. Supp. 14
(S.D. Cal. 1960). The court cited a California state court decision requiring exhaustion unless it could be held as a matter of law that such procedure
would be to no avail. Id. at 18. A more liberal view has now been taken
by the Second Circuit. In Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
88

1964), it held: "Where . . . conceded facts show a serious violation of a

fundamental right, we hold that plaintiffs need not exhaust their union
remedies." Id. at 219. (Observe that Calhoon reversed this court's interpretation of section 101(a) (1) of the LMRDA.)
88 Wirtz v. Local 125, Int'l Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio
1964).
"Id. at 595. The court approved the "futility" doctrine as stated in
Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 1962) (appeal unnecessary
when persons it was directed against were to hear it, but refused to hear
the Secretary's complaint since it appeared that appeal was not futile).
(The Secretary contended that the exhaustion requirement did not bind
the court; he did not argue that appeal was futile.)
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reliance on the Secretary of Labor support the congressional policy
of allowing unions the greatest possible latitude in handling their
internal affairs. Before the ruling in Calhoon, several district courts
had heard cases alleging Title I violations and had given effect to
this policy, denying pre-election relief and holding that a Title IV,
not a Title I, violation was alleged.4"
Calhoon represents a functional interpretation of the act. It
achieves a delicate balance between union freedom and individual
justice. The Court understood that Congress did not intend restrictions concerning candidacy, whether "reasonable" or unreasonable, to constitute a Title I violation. Both the legislative history
and the policy implicit in the other provisions of the act justify
this conclusion. The act seeks to prevent union abuse in its internal
procedures, not to establish a means of ignoring those procedures.
The Supreme Court, though denying plaintiffs an immediate remedy,
has upheld the congressional policy of relying upon union procedures as long as they effectively protect the rights of union members guaranteed in the act.
GEORGE CARsoN II

Practice and Procedure-Res Judicata in Parent's Suit for Medical
Expenses and Loss of Services
The recent North Carolina decision of Kleibor v. Rogers' restates the majority rule that, following an injury to his minor child,
a father is not barred from bringing an action for medical expenses
and loss of services and earnings of the infant when the infant has
failed on the merits in a prior suit based on the same occurrence.'
" Jackson v. National Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 221 F. Supp. 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Jackson v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F.
Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp.
307 (D. Del. 1961); Johnson v. San Diego Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp.
444 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
-265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965). The case arises out of an injury
to plaintiff's nine-year-old son. Judgment for the defendant in a prior
action by the mother as next friend was held not to be res judicata in
the father's action.
I See cases collected in Annot., 133 A.L.R. 181, 201-02 (1941). For other
North Carolina cases see, e.g., Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d
925 (1955); Rabil v. Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938); Thigpen v.
Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N.C. 97, 65 S.E. 750 (1909). The rule was
criticized and the application of res judicata in these cases was urged in
North Carolina Case Law--Judgments, 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 461, 462 (1958).
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However, the court indicated a willingness to change this holding
and bind the father if the defendant could amend and show that
the father controlled the minor's suit within the meaning of section
84 of the Restatement of Judgments.3 If a showing of control
could be made, the court said that res judicata would apply,4 and
the expense and trouble of a new trial to the court, 5 taxpayers,
litigants, and witnesses would be partially eliminated.
While in the usual circumstances the father would seem to have,
as the Restatement requires, a "proprietary or financial interest in
the judgment or in the determination of a question of fact or of a
question of law with reference to the same subject matter or transaction,"' it is not clear what degree of proof of defendant's control
is required. The North Carolina court, when discussing control,
has talked of the failure of the defendant to show that one not in
privy nevertheless "participated in the trial or that they 'openly and
actively' and with respect to some interest of their own, 'assumed
and managed' the prosecution."' It is clear from decisions8 and
'RESTATEMENT,

JUDGMENTS

§ 84 (1942):

A person who is not a party but who controls an action, individually or in co-operation with others, is bound by the adjudications of
litigated matters as if he were a party if he has a proprietary or
financial interest in the judgment or in the determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with reference to the same subject matter or transaction; if the other party has notice of his participation, the other party is equally bound.
'265 N.C. at 308, 144 S.E.2d at 30. For other cases discussing the
control idea see White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959);
Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957) ; Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679, 79 S.E.2d 167

(1953).
'One of the chief arguments for passage of the recent bond issue to
secure funds for an intermediate appellate court was that the North Carolina
court's burden is much greater than that of the majority of the several
states. Greensboro Daily News, Oct. 8, 1965, § B, p. 1, col. 5.
'RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84 (1942).
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Ins. Co., 238 N.C.
679, 693, 79 S.E.2d 167, 176 (1953). It is suggested that there should be
no requirement of an "open and active" participation in order to bind the
party who controlled the first action, since to do so would be to defeat the
purpose of res judicata and give a litigant two days in court. But when a
party loses to an unknown adversary, he should not be bound. This is the
position taken in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941), where the defendant who secretly controlled
a prior suit in a Nevada federal court was bound by the judgment in a
subsequent suit in a New Jersey federal court, both suits based upon the
same patents.
'Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957); Rabil v.
Farris, 213 N.C. 414, 196 S.E. 321 (1938).
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Restatement 9

from the
that acting as next friend in the infant's
suit is not sufficient control in itself, nor is the mere supplying of
funds for the infant's attorney. 10 However, both selecting and paying for the attorney has been held an act of control elsewhere."
It is noteworthy that the North Carolina court makes a distinction between a father as next friend for a plaintiff-infant and a
father as guardian ad litem for a defendant-infant. In Thompson
2 the plaintiff who had been guardian ad litem for his
v. Lassiter1
son was barred in his suit for medical expenses and loss of earnings
and services of the minor because the son had been found negligent
in the first action. Indicating that as guardian ad litem the father
would make more effort than as next friend, 3 the court said that
"in legal effect, the distinctions are substantial and not merely
formal ....

"114

Even if a liberal test for finding control is adopted, the fact remains that a second suit must be instigated to determine the existence of control, which means additional court time with the attendant
expense and inconvenience.' 5 Other approaches are available and
should be considered.
A minority of jurisdictions have adopted a derivative approach.1°
That is, if the infant is unable to establish liability on the part of
the defendant, then any cause of action that the father might have
§ 84, comment f (1942).
"'Id. at commentJUDGMENTS
e.
,Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82
'RESTATEMENT,

(3d Cir. 1941).

-246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
"3It would seem that if the infant is totally dependent upon his father,
if they are living under the same roof, and if the infant is totally disabled, the likelihood of the burden of support after majority will rest upon
the father. With this in mind, a father as next friend may well have a
greater interest in his infant's claim for permanent injuries than he would
in defending, as guardian ad litem, an infant who is, for instance, protected
by liability insurance.
' Thompson v. Lassiter, 246 N.C. 34, 38, 97 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1957).
" Whether or not the father exercised control in the first suit could well
involve questions of fact requiring a jury and subject to appeal so that, in
fact, the blessing could become an added burden. The possibility is also
present that a father with reservations about the soundness of his and the
infant's claims could insure a second trial by systematically and consciously
avoiding participation in the infant's suit.
1 See Jones v. Schmidt, 349 Il. App. 336, 110 N.E.2d 688 (1953);
Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952);
Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318 (1947); Reilly v. Rawleigh,
281 N.Y. Supp. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Boyett v. Airline Lumber Co., 277
P.2d 676 (Okla. 1954) ; Wheng v. Hong, 206 Ore. 125, 290 P.2d 185 (1955);
67 C.J.S. Parents & Child § 41 (1950).
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had fails to mature. As one court has expressed it: "The mere
fact that a parent has sustained damages . . . does not give the
parent a cause of action. Such cause of action of the parent is
derivative to the extent that if the child cannot recover neither can
the parent."' 7 This approach is reasonable in that a defendant is not
called upon a second time to prove fully adjudicated facts. It should
be noted, however, that in the converse situation where the plaintiffinfant wins in the first suit the defendant is not bound by the
results.' This is because the father must still prove that he has
suffered damages' 9 or because his burden of proof may be greater.20
As seen above, in both the majority and minority approaches to
infant-parent suits, a second trial is often necessary. This duplication could be eliminated if the statutory requirement that all causes
must affect all parties 21 were changed to permit or require joinder
of the two actions.22 The court has, in fact, already judicially modified the joinder rule by holding that the father waives his rights to a
separate suit if the child, with the father's knowledge, claims damages, which would normally be the father's, and the defendant does
not enter a timely objection 23 If the statute is modified to permit 24
joinder in all infant-parent causes of action, the rights of the parties
can be protected in one suit and costly litigation avoided.
" Pokeda v. Nash, 47 N.Y.S.2d 954, 957 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
"Holden v. Bloom, 314 Mass. 309, 50 N.E.2d 193 (1943); Annot., 32
A.L.R.2d 1060 (1953).
" McCray v. Earls, 267 Ky. 89, 101 S.W.2d 192 (1936).
" Hinckley v. Capital Motor Transp. Co., 321 Mass. 174, 72 N.E.2d 419
(1947).
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953).
2 This approach has been urged in an extended article where adoption
of the substance of the federal joinder rules was seen as a solution to many
illogical results, as illustrated by the infant-parent cases. Brandis, A Plea
for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal Joinder Rides, 25 N.C.L.
REv. 245 (1947). Judge Goodwin of Oregon states:
As a matter of abstract public policy, and, indeed, of common sense,
there is much to be said for the proposition that one trial is enough.
Assuming the desirability of combining the two cases in one trial,
before one jury, the solution lies in a joinder procedure, rather than
in collateral estoppel. Joinder would insure the right of each party to
protect his own interest. That matter, however, is one for the legislature.
Wolff v. DuPuis, 233 -Ore. 317, 323, 378 P.2d 707, 710 (1963).
Pascal v. Burke Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534 (1948).
24 To accomplish the most desirable results, the word "permit" should be
construed to mean, in these cases, that the father inust be joined if he can be
served. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 511 (Wright ed. 1961).
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It is submitted that the present rule in these cases should be
altered. The adoption of a control test will work toward a desirable
end, particularly if liberally applied, but as indicated above, two
suits will still be required. The minority view, whereby the parent's
action is derived from the child's and must fall if the child fails,
would be an improvement, but it also sometimes requires two trials.
It is urged that the best solution is in a statutory revision to permit
joinder, giving all of the parties their day in court, while at the
same time eliminating a costly second trial.
PnILIp G. CARsoN
Taxation-Deductions of Rental Payments after Gift and Leaseback
to Short-Term Trust-Taxation of Income
Taxpayers may use the gift and leaseback device to effect tax
saving with greater confidence as a result of a recent decision of
the Tax Court of the United States.1 The gift and leaseback has
been popular among some taxpayers in high income brackets, chiefly physicians, as a method of reducing income taxes while boosting
total family income.2 Its popularity began to decline, however, when
the Tax Court held in I. L. Van Zandt3 that a noncorporate taxpayer had to show a "business purpose" for making a gift of real
estate to a trust before he could validly deduct rental payments
made to the trust on leaseback of the property.4
1 Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. No. 48 (July 6, 1965).
The popularity of the gift and leaseback is reflected by the amount of
litigation it has generated. Notable successes include Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v.
Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Commissioner v. Greenspun,
156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946), on remand, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1948);
Alden B. Oakes, supra note 1.
40 T.C. 824 (1963), af'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965), 86 Sup. Ct. 32 (1965).
'The court said:
Since deductions are matters of legislative grace and the taxpayer
has the burden of proving he is entitled to them, the petitioner here
must establish that the rental payments were in fact "ordinary and
necessary" expenses in his medical practice. While they may be
ordinary, were they necessary under these circumstances? We think
not. The petitioner owned and used the building and medical equipment in his "trade or business" before he ever created the trusts,
transferred the property to the trusts, and then leased it back. Actually he continued to use the property in exactly the same manner he
had before these transactions were arranged and carried out. This
indicates a lack of any business purpose, which we believe is implicitly
required by section 162(a).
40 T.C. at 830-31. (Emphasis added.)
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The Tax Court repudiated the Van Zandt "business purpose"
test in the case of Alden B. Oakes,5 decided in July 1965, and
cleared the way to renewed interest in the use of the gift and leaseback. The device has frequently been used in conjunction with a
short-term trust0 and was so used by taxpayers Van Zandt and
Oakes. The latter used it successfully while the former did not.
An illustration of a typical situation involving a short-term
trust and a gift and leaseback will be helpful in demonstrating
how the device works. The taxpayer establishes an irrevocable trust
with a term of at least ten years and a day' for the benefit of his
minor children, conveying real estate used in his business (the gift)
to the trust as its corpus. He then leases the same property from
the trust (the leaseback), being careful not to pay more than a
reasonable rental,' and deducts the rent payments as business expenses." Upon the termination of the trust the property reverts to
the taxpayer, unless he has sold or otherwise disposed of his reversionary interest.
Assuming the taxpayer's rental deductions are larger than any
depreciation deductions he might have claimed if he had kept the
property, 10 and assuming any gift tax on the transaction is less than
the potential saving of income tax, 1 the taxpayer's reward from
using this device is a reduction of his taxes. In addition, he is
'44 T.C. No. 48 (July 6, 1965).
'As used in this note, a short-term trust is any trust of limited duration
that complies with all of the requirements of §§ 671-78 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, so that the income of the trust will not be taxed to
the grantor.

" The term must be longer than ten years in order to comply with § 673 (a)
of the Code.
'Reasonableness of the rental is one of the factors that determines the
deductibility of rent payments. See, e.g., Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225
F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1955), where the court found a yearly rental of
$19,412.25 to be unreasonable when the same property had rented for $1,050
per year before the gift and leaseback, and denied the deductions on this
basis.
' Deductions are permitted by § 162(a) (3) of the Code for reasonable
rental payments that must be made for purposes of a trade or business.
10 "For a leaseback to be profitable tax-wise, property must either be
non-depreciable (real estate) or have a low basis, since rent deduction
through a leaseback arrangement is a substitute for depreciation." Cohen,
Transfers and Leasebacks to Trusts: Tax and Planning Considerations, 43
VA.11L. REv. 31 (1957).
Under § 2521 of the Code a donor has a $30,000 lifetime exemption
from the gift tax, and under § 2503(b), he has an annual exclusion of $3,000
per donee provided such gift is not a "future interest." Moreover, the aforesaid amounts may be doubled by the donor by "splitting the gift" under
§ 2513 of the Code.
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indirectly rewarded through the benefit that his children receive
from the trust. A tax reduction for the family will result only if
the income is taxed to the trust or its beneficiaries at a rate lower
than that paid by the grantor on his income. The difference in the
tax at the lower rate and the tax at the higher rate accrues to the
benefit of the taxpayer's family as an economic unit and makes the
gift and leaseback device worthwhile for high bracket taxpayers. 2
While perhaps the most important advantage to be gained by
use of a gift and leaseback with a short-term trust is splitting of
income between a parent in a high tax bracket and children in lower
brackets, this is not the only advantage. 3 The device may be useful
for assuring education expenses for children, 4 assuring income for
aged relatives,' providing life insurance coverage on persons other
than the taxpayer,'" and for accomplishing many other purposes.
Its use is limited only by the ingenuity of the planner and provisions of law.
A taxpayer must pay particular attention to two primary issues
if he is to use the gift-leaseback device successfully with a shortterm trust. These are (1) whether or not the rental payments to
the trust are deductible to the grantor, and (2) whether the trust
" For an illustration of how worthwhile it can be, see Yohlin, The ShortTerm Trust-A Respectable Tax-Saving Device, 14 TAX L. REv. 109, 110

(1958)

FFor a general idea of the many applications of the gift and leaseback
device with a short-term trust, see Drew, Paying Family Expenses and
Saving Taxes, 37 TAXES 689 (1959), and Yohlin, op. cit. supra note 12.
" In setting up a trust to assure education expenses for children, the
grantor must bear in mind that trust income applied or distributed for the
support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated to support or maintain will be taxable to the grantor under authority
of § 677(b). However, the measure of the parent's legal obligation is to be
found in local rather than federal law, Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1956),
and no cases have been found in which a state required a parent to furnish
a college or professional education for his child. Therefore, it is doubtful
that trust income used to defray a child's college expenses, other than room,
board and clothing, will be taxable to the parent.
"The principle of § 677(b) of the Code applies to support of parents
as well, and if the grantor is under a legal obligation to support them
under state law, trust income used for their support will be taxable to him.
Still, a trust for the benefit of parents can be a useful device when the
income is used only to supplement the parents' own funds.
"' Trust income used to buy insurance policies on the life of the grantor
will be taxed to the grantor. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). See
generally Durant, Trust Income and the Payment of Premimns, 27 TAXES 904
(1949); Smith, Federal Taxation of Insurance Trusts, 40 MIcH. L. REV.
207 (1941). But trust income used to pay premiums on insurance covering
someone other than the grantor is not taxable to the grantor.
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income is taxable to the trust, to the beneficiary or to the grantor.
The gift and leaseback device will yield no tax saving if the rental
deductions are disallowed or if the trust income is found to be taxable to the grantor.
In determining the issue of deductibility of rental payments
under a gift and leaseback with a short-term trust, the courts have
chosen to look at several factors. Chief among these in the past
have been the extent of prearrangement of the leaseback,'17 the
independence of the trustee,' the revocability of the trust,' 9 and
the reasonableness of the rental payments.2"
The Van Zandt decision was the first application by the Tax
Court of a business purpose test to a gift and leaseback made by a
noncorporate taxpayer. 2 ' In order to understand what misled the
court in applying the test, it is first necessary to examine the section
of the Internal Revenue Code under which the taxpayer claimed a
deduction for rental expenses. The deduction was claimed under
section 162(a) (3), which says:
(a) IN GENERAL-There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of
the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
22
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
7
' See Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095, 1101 (1949).
'" See Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 929 (3d Cir. 1950), reversing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949).
See Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
20 See Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th
Cir. 1955).
"In I. L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824, 830 (1963), while the court purportedly acted under the authority of a line of decisions, a study of the
decisions it cited shows that a business purpose test was determinative of
only one other case involving a gift and leaseback. This case, White v.
Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), was criticized by a dissenting
judge as a mistaken application of the business purpose test. The test had
been applied in earlier cases involving a sale and leaseback, and two of
the four cases cited by the Van Zandt court were sale and leaseback rather
than gift and leaseback cases. W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188
F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951), affirining 12 T.C. 539 (1940); Unger v. Campbell, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547 (N.D. Tex. 1960). The court in the fourth
case found there was no gift because of lack of showing of a clear and
unequivocal intention to part with the property. Johnson v. Commissioner,
86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936), affirming 33 B.T.A. 1003 (1936).
2" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)
(3).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

The Van Zandt court held the rental payments in that particular
gift and leaseback situation were not "necessary" within the meaning of section 162 (a) (3) because the taxpayer had owned the property before the transfer, and there was no compelling business reason
for him to give it to the trust; thus the rental was not "required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession" of the
property.23 The Oakes court said the test of business necessity required by section 162 (a) (3) should be made by viewing the situation as it exists after the gift is made, not before.24 It is clear
that if the court had not repudiated the Van Zandt test in Oakes,
the gift and leaseback would have become valueless as a device for
saving income taxes. To require the showing of a business purpose
for giving property to the trust is tantamount to an automatic disallowance of the rental deduction. Rarely, if ever, is there a valid
business reason for making such a gift to a trust.
In abandoning the "business purpose" test of Van Zandt, the
Oakes court did not say why it was repudiating the earlier position.
The court may have had in mind a distinction explained in a recent
article by Professor Froehlich in the CaliforniaLaw Review.2 5 That
distinction is that a rational basis exists for applying such a "business
purpose" test to a gift and leaseback in the case of a corporation,
but does not exist in the case of an individual. The author explained that a corporation is by nature business motivated and
ordinarily does not make gifts. Therefore, where a corporation
transfers property to a related entity and then leases it back, it
In affirming the case on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit said:
[I]t seems to us inevitably we must look at the original conveyance
of the property together with the execution of the leaseback as a single
transaction. Thus viewing it, we conclude that the obligation to pay
rent resulted not as an ordinary and necessary incident in the conduct
of the business, but was in fact created solely for the purpose of
permitting a division of the taxpayer's income tax.
341 F.2d at 443.
" The court said:
At that point, since Alden Oakes needed a building for practicing
medicine, he agreed to rent the property from the trustee for a reasonable amount. Consequently, we believe there is a sound basis for
holding that the rent paid by Oakes was, in terms of section 162,
both "ordinary and necessary" and "required to be made as a condition to continued use ...of property."
"

44 T.C. at"Froehlich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus:
Leaseback Arrangements, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 956, 973-74 (1964).
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would appear proper to look to the business reasons for the transfer
in determining deductibility of lease payments. Professor Froehlich
continued:
An individual, however, is governed by many non-business
influences, and it is recognized that all his transfers need not be
business motivated. He may, for instance, make outright gifts
of income producing assets. No one has ever challenged the right
of an individual to establish a ...

[short-term] trust with stock

of a corporation, for instance. Similarly, there should be no problem created by a proprietor's transferring some of his business
assets to his child's trust. The fact that the transaction has no
its bona fides-it is not
business purpose has nothing to do with
26
intended to have a business purpose.
Another factor which has recently come to bear on the issue
of deductibility of rental payments made to a short-term trust is
the requirement in section 162 (a) (3) that the taxpayer have no
"equity" in the property he is renting. The section permits deductions only for property "to which the taxpayer has not taken or is
27
not taking title or in which he has no equity."
A few recent cases in, the gift and leaseback area have adopted
a broad, literal interpretation of this phrase and, as an alternative
basis for decision, have denied rental deductions because the lessee
had an "equity" in the property.28 What exactly is the prohibited
"equity," and what effect does it have on practical applications of
the gift and leaseback device in conjunction with a short-term
trust? The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken the position that the "equity" is any equitable interest held by the taxpayer
in the rented property.29 This interpretation has a direct and adverse
Id. at 973.
27

See text accompanying note 22 supra. (Emphasis added.)

'See Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1962),
where the grantors retained the power to dispose of the corpus of the
trust and the court said "it would seem that the grantors had an equity
in the premises at least until the power of sale was exercised and for that
reason also the Commissioner was right in disallowing the deduction";
Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1955), where the

concurring opinion suggested that another ground for disallowance of the
deduction was that the grantor had an "equity" in the property because he
bought the property under a mortgage and gave it to the trust subject to
the mortgage, retaining an equity of redemption.
2 In discussing the Commissioner's contention that taxpayer Oakes had
retained the prohibited "equity," the Oakes court defined "equity" as a
"right of redemption, a reversionary interest, a right to specific performance,
or in general any right respecting property which traditionally would have
-.
been enforceable by means of an equitable remedy." 44 T,C. at
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impact on the use of a short-term trust with a gift and leaseback,
as will be presently shown.
One of the primary reasons why the taxpayer chooses a shortterm trust as the tax-saving vehicle is the fact that it permits him
to regain control of the property after his purpose has been served ;30
i.e., in giving real estate to a trust for ten years, he retains a reversionary interest in the property, and upon the termination of the
trust at the end of the ten-year period the property reverts to him.
Thus, he is able to effect a tax saving during a temporary period
of family need-for instance, when his children need money for
college tuition and expenses-and he is restored to full ownership
rights in his property when the temporary need has been satisfied.
Is the reversionary interest retained by the settlor of the trust
an "equity" within the meaning of the rental deduction section of
the Code? If it is, then he may not deduct rental payments upon
leaseback. It is true that he can avoid this consequence by either
selling or giving away this reversionary interest. However, if he
does either of these he will not regain control of the property upon
termination of the trust, which amounts to a failure of his primary
consideration for choosing a short-term trust.
The Oakes decision approved by implication the Commissioner's
contention that rental deductions should be disallowed whenever the
lessee has any equitable interest in the property.3' However, neither
the Oakes case nor other decisions in the gift and leaseback area
that have dealt with the "equity" problem have met the issue headon. In Oakes the court found that the taxpayer had no equity in
the property because he had sold his reversionary interest to his
wife. 2 The court failed to consider the probability that Oakes retained effective control over the reversionary interest in his wife's
hands. In the future, the court will likely take notice of this prob00

0

See Yohlin, op. cit. supra note 12.

44 T.C. at
"The court said:
One of the reasons why respondent asserts Alden Oakes did not
divest himself of sufficient control and ownership over the property
is that upon termination of the trust the property must be returned
to the grantors. This argument disregards two pertinent facts, viz.,
the pre-existing and continuing interest of the wife and the transfer
of the doctor's remainder interest to his wife. Surely, after April 28,
1959, Alden Oakes had neither a present nor a remainder interest
in the trust property. His wife alone was then left with the power to
eventually dispose of the trust corpus.
Id, at
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ability and use it as a basis for denying deductions. In the other
cases the "equity" issue was not the sole basis for decision. 8
Insofar as they are authority for the argument that deductions
should be refused whenever the taxpayer retains any type of equity
in the property, however, it is submitted that the cases are in error.
Such a broad interpretation of section 162 (a) (3) urged upon the
courts by the Commissioner is unwarranted. To follow the argument of the Commissioner to its logical conclusion would mean that
no person having a future interest in real estate could rent that real
estate from the holder of the present possessory interest and get the
benefit of a rental deduction, for if he had a future interest in the
property, he would have an equity.
The legislative history of the section offers no clue to the meaning of "equity." 4 The only clue available is in a series of cases
dealing with leases containing purchase options. 35 Here, the courts
have been concerned by the fact that the lessee has an equity in the
property-the option to purchase. Instead, they have looked to the
rental payments to see whether the payments are for "rent" or
whether they are for the "purchase" of the property. Deductions
have been allowed unless it was determined that each rental payment increased the ownership interest of the lessee-optionee.8 6 It is
submitted that these cases correctly interpret "equity" in the context
of this section in its colloquial usage as "ownership" rather than in
its legal usage, and that the purpose behind inclusion of the phrase
is to prevent persons from deducting as rental expense, money that
was really being applied toward purchase of the property.
Turning now to the problem of taxation of the income of the
trust, will the income be taxable to the trust, to the beneficiaries, or
to the grantor? The main concern of the grantor is that the income
not be taxed to him. Many of the problems connected with the
In Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955), the court
held the rent payments nondeductible because they were not paid as a
condition to continued use of the property in the taxpayer's business, and
in Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), the court
disallowed the deductions because the taxpayers retained control over the
actions of the trustee.
",See H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) and S. REP. No.
793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
3'5
See Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th
Cir. 1956); Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Edward E. Haverstick, 13
B.T.A. 837 (1928).

3"Ibid.
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taxation of the income of a short-term trust have been either solved
or simplified by the so-called "Clifford Trust" provisions of the
1954 Code,3 7 and if the grantor will carefully comply with their
requirements, he will be largely assured that the trust income will
not be taxed to him.
Tax consequences of a gift and leaseback are sufficiently predictable to permit use of the device for income-splitting among
family members. However, taxpayers should be wary in using the
device with a short-term trust so long as the possibility exists that
a reversionary interest held by the grantor in the trust corpus will
be found to be a prohibited equity under section 162(a) (3).
Until this issue is settled favorably, it would appear wise to make
a gift of the entire fee to the trust, to sell the reversionary interest,
or to give the remainder interest to another beneficiary who is not
so related to the taxpayer as to raise an issue of his possible continued control over the property.
THOMAS

J.

BOLCH

Taxation-Strike Benefits as Income
The Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income "the
value of property acquired by gift."' Although similar language
was contained in the first income tax statute2 following enactment
of the sixteenth amendment and in all subsequent revenue acts,3
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. The name "Clifford" comes from
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the landmark case requiring

the settlor to pay tax on the income of a short-term trust where he retained
substantial elements of control over the trust corpus and income. This case
caused a great amount of uncertainty and resulted in the promulgation by
the Treasury of the Clifford Regulations, which set up a series of clear
tests defining the situations in which the income of a trust would be taxable
to the grantor. These regulations were put into the Code itself in 1954.
1

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
' Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167, provided that gross
income shall not include "the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent."
' Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39 Stat. 758; War Revenue Act of
1917, ch. 63, § 1200, 40 Stat. 329; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b) (3),
40 Stat. 1065; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b) (3), 42 Stat. 238;
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213(b) (3), 43 Stat. 268; Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 213(b) (3), 44 Stat. 24; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §
22(b)(3), 45 Stat. 798; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22(b)(3), 48
Stat. 687; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b) (3), 49 Stat. 1657;
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b) (3), 52 Stat. 458; INT. REv. CODE OF
1939, § 22(b)(3), as amended, ch. 619, § 111(a) (3), 56 Stat. 809 (1942)

(now

INT.

REv.

CODE OF

1954, § 102(a)).
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Congress has never defined "gift" 4 for income tax purposes, nor has
the Commissioner attempted its definition in his regulations." Because of this the definition of "gift" has necessarily been left to
the courts to shape on an ad hoc basis.
The intention of the donor6 is the most critical factor in determining whether a particular transfer is a gift. This intention,
however, is to be distinguished from the personal property law concept of "donative intent"' because the income tax statute uses the
term "gift" in a more colloquial sense' than did the common law.
A gift in the statutory sense must derive from a "detached and
disinterested generosity," 9 arising "out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses."' ° However, the donor's characterization of his action is not conclusive because "there must be an
objective inquiry as to whether what is called a gift amounts to it
in reality."' 1 The mere absence of a moral or legal obligation to
make the transfer does not necessarily create a gift.' 2 But, if the
transfer proceeds primarily from "the constraining force of any
moral or legal duty,"'" or from the incentive of anticipated benefits,' 4 or where payment is in return for services rendered, even
though the donor receives no economic benefit,'5 it is not a gift.
Because the law had become "unclear and uncertain ' 16 and because of the Treasury's insistence that it had found a "new" test
that would "almost automatically dispose of the great bulk of the
'gift' cases,"' 17 the United States Supreme Court in 1959 granted
certiorari in two cases that were to become the leading cases in
the field: Commissioner v. Duberstein8 and Stanton v. United
'For a proposed solution to the gift vs. income problem, which was not
adopted, see 106 CONG. REc. 12449 (1960).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1 (1965).
'Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
See Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68 (1873).
s Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
'Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
' Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
"Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 40 (1937).
12 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929).
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
"Ibid.
5
' Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
18 Brief for Respondent, p. 5, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278
(1960).
"Id. at 29.
18363 U.S. 278 (1960). In Duberstein the taxpayer had from time to
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States." The Treasury's "new" test that "gifts should be defined as
transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from business reasons" 20 was rejected by the Court, as was the Treasury's suggestion that "motive" rather than "intention" govern the taxability
of a particular transfer.2 ' In rejecting the Treasury's invitation to fix
a "standard to be applied by the lower courts and the Tax Court,"22
the Supreme Court stated that "the governing principles are necessarily general ... [and] the problem is one which, under the present

statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive
time furnished the president of Mohawk Metal Corp. with the names of

potential customers for Mohawk's products. In appreciation, and over his
protest that he was owed nothing, taxpayer received a Cadillac automobile.
Taxpayer did not include the value of the automobile in his gross income
for 1951, deeming it a gift. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency for
the value of the car that was sustained by the Tax Court, which found the
automobile was remuneration for services rendered by taxpayer. Mose
Duberstein, 1958 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 13 (1958). The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28
(6th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. 363
U.S. at 293.
Stanton and Duberstein. were argued together
1" 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
and consolidated into one opinion. In Stanton taxpayer had been employed
for ten years by Trinity Church as comptroller of the church corporation
and as president of a "holy" owned subsidiary that the church had established to manage its real estate holdings. In 1942 taxpayer resigned both
positions to go into business for himself. In appreciation for his services,
the board of directors of the subsidiary, which included the vicar and
vestry of the church, voted taxpayer a $20,000 "gratuity." Taxpayer failed
to include the "gratuity" in his gross income, and the Commissioner asserted
a deficiency. In taxpayer's suit for recovery, the district court found that
the payment was a "gift." Stanton v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 803
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd, 286 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), rema duing for addifinding of fact, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
tional
' 0Id.at 284 n.6.
"1The Treasury reasoned that the only factual distinction that could be
made among the various kinds of voluntary payments was the difference in
"motive," or reasons why they were made. Brief for Respondent, p. 23,
Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Motive was defined as
the inducing cause of the payments or transfer. The Treasury argued that
for tax purposes the distinction should be made between those transactions
motivated by personal and those motivated by business reasons. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 13-15, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960);
Brief for Respondent, pp. 29-33, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278
(1960). A business reason was to be any reason that established a "proximate .. .causal relationship between the payment and the conduct of the

business, the production of income, or the performances of services." Brief
for Respondent, p. 29, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
Any reason that was not a business reason would be a personal one. If
such a transfer was sufficiently related to the business in such a way as to
be an allowable deduction for tax purposes, then it could not qualify as a
gift. Id. at 30.
" Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
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statement .
." The Court reasoned that the problem "remains
basically one of fact, for determination on a case-by-case basis."'24 It
concluded that the decision in each case must be determined by
*.".

the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each
case .. . . [P]rimary weight in this area must be given to the
25
conclusions of the trier of fact.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reproached
the Court for setting "fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable
'26
ocean of individual beliefs and experiences.
It was upon this background of uncertainty that the Supreme
Court for the first time considered in United States v. Kaiser2 7 the
income tax consequences of union strike benefits. The taxpayer in
Kaiser was an employee of the Kohler Company of Wisconsin. The
bargaining representative at Kohler, a local of the United Automobile Workers, called a strike, and taxpayer went out on strike
although he was not a member of the union. His job was his sole
source of income, and when he found himself in need of financial
assistance, he applied to the union for help. After he had been
questioned about his financial resources and dependents, the union
agreed to pay his rent and give him a food voucher redeemable in
kind at the local grocery store. To receive these strike benefits
taxpayer did not have to join the union, nor did he have to perform
any picketing duties. Taxpayer failed to include the amount of the
strike benefits in his gross income. In the district court2 s the trial
judge submitted to the jury the simple interrogatory of whether
the strike assistance was a gift. The jury answered that it was,
but the court held as a matter of law that the benefit payments were
29
income. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that
"on the basis of our opinion in the Duberstein Case. . . the jury in
this case, as finder of the facts, acted within its competence in
concluding that the assistance rendered here was a gift."3 0 The
Ibid.
2
at 290.
2 1Id.
Id. at 289.
23

Id. at 297 (concurring opinion).

2,363 U.S. 299 (1960).
2 Kaiser v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
2 Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958).
30363 U.S. at 303.
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court listed several factors from which the jury could have inferred
that the assistance did not proceed from a "constraint of moral or
legal obligation, of a nature that would preclude it from being a
gift."'" These factors are (1) the form and amount of the assistance and the conditions of personal need, (2) the lack of other
sources of income, compensation, or public assistance, (3) the dependency status, and (4) that, while the assistance was furnished
only to strikers, it was not conditioned upon performing any strike
2

duties.1

Since Kaiser, four lower-court cases, two in the federal district
court and two in the tax court, have held that union strike benefits
were not gifts but were taxable income to the taxpayers. The first
of these decisions was Godwin v. United States.3 3 Godwin dealt
with payments made by the Air Line Pilots' Association to a striking pilot. In Godwin the judge did not let the case go to the jury
but held as a matter of law that the strike benefit payments were
not gifts. The court listed several factors which it thought distinguished the case from Kaiser. First, the union did not consider
the personal financial situation of the individual pilots or the availability of help from outside sources, such as unemployment insurance, in determining how much each pilot would be paid, but paid
each pilot sixty per cent of his salary. Second, while the amount
of the payments in Kaiser were very small, were not paid in cash
and were not paid directly to the taxpayer, here the payments to
the taxpayer amounted to approximately 700 dollars a month and
were paid in cash directly to the striking taxpayer. Third, the taxpayer in Godwin was a member of the union and participated directly in the strike. Last, the union voted to pay the pilots strike
benefits before they actually went out on strike. The court thought
that this would give the pilots a "legally enforceable right to receive
[the] benefits."' 34 In keeping the case from the jury, the court
relied on the "motive" of the union in making the payments, reasoning that whether a benefit payment was a gift or income depended
upon whether it flowed from charitable motives exclusively. In
other words, in order to get this case to the jury, the Court

would have to determine that there is some evidence from which
01 Id. at 304.
0"Ibid.
" 65-1 U.S. TAx. CAs.
8"Id. at 94, 576.

9121 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).

1966]

STRIKE BENEFITS AS INCOME

a jury could find that the only motive for these payments was
charitable .... 35
The second case after Kaiser was that of John N. Hagar,s
where the taxpayer was employed as a copy editor for a St. Louis
newspaper. When the union of which taxpayer was a member, a
local of the American Newspaper Guild, called a strike against the
newspaper, taxpayer actively participated in the strike and received
strike benefit payments. In reaching its decision the Tax Court
was careful to state that it found "as a matter of fact" 37 that the
payments were income and not gifts. The court thought that the
facts that distinguished it from Kaiser were (1) the taxpayer was
at all times a union member, (2) the benefit payments were not
paid to or available for nonunion members, (3) the taxpayer was
required to perform strike duties before he was eligible for the
benefit payments, and (4) the union's failure to inquire into the
financial resources of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's need for the
payments was also doubtful."8
9
In Halsor
After Hagar came the case of Halsor v. Lethert."
the taxpayer, a pilot, was not on strike but was laid off by Northwestern Airlines as a result of a dispute between the International
Association of Machinists and the Air Line Pilots Association.
While he was locked out, the local of the ALPA passed a resolution
whereby "the pilots furloughed due to the dispute arising from
implementation of ALPA Policy"4 would receive benefit payments
from the ALPA. The payments were based on a certain percentage
of the pilot's salary and were not subject to setoff against other
income received by the pilots during the lockout. The court, in
finding as a fact that the payments were not gifts, stressed the
"intention"4 1 of the union, which it found to be the furtherance of
"Ibid. The use of the donor's motive to determine whether a given
transfer is to be treated by the recipient as a gift or income was expressly
rejected in the Duberstein case. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
8843 T.C. 468 (1965).
Id. at 486.
88Ibid. The taxpayer's wife while he was on strike received a bi-weekly
take-home pay of $152.93. Taxpayer had a joint tenancy with his wife and
mother in several saving accounts with substantial balances. In addition,
taxpayer had some dividend income during the time of the strike. His wife
was his only dependent.
88240 F. Supp. 738 (D. Minn. 1965).
,oId. at 739.
"Id. at 738.
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the objectives of the association and not a "'detached and disinterested generosity' which is the requisite of a gift under § 102. ' '42
The last case dealing with strike benefit payments is that of
Mabel Phillips.3 The facts in Phillips are almost identical to those
in Hagar,and the tax court relied heavily on Hagar in holding the
benefits taxable. In Phillips,the taxpayer was a journeyman stereotyper and a member of a local of the Stereotypers' and Electrotypers' International Union that struck the newspaper where he was
employed. To receive his benefit payments, taxpayer had to be a
member of the union in good standing and had to "sign-in" daily
at the strike headquarters. The amount of his payments, which
were substantial in comparison with his salary, was not dependent
upon his marital status, number of dependents or financial need,
but was dependent solely upon his classification as a journeyman.
The court concluded that these factors, plus a finding that the union
was morally obligated under its constitution to make the payments
once the taxpayer went on strike, prevented them from being considered as a gift.
While other areas of the gift vs. income dispute may remain
"unclear and uncertain," it would seem that the decisions in Godwin,
Hagar,Halsor, and Phillips have removed some of the confusion
as to the income tax consequences of union strike benefit payments.
Although the question whether a strike benefit payment in a given
case is a gift or taxable income still remains a factual one, it seems
certain that the benefits received in any case in which the facts are
not very nearly on all fours with Kaiser cannot be classified as a gift.
THOMAS E. CAPPS

Torts-North Carolina's "Good Samaritan" Statute
The 1965 North Carolina General Assembly passed a "Good
Samaritan" statute which provides that:
Any person who renders first aid or emergency assistance at the
scene of a motor vehicle accident on any street or highway to
any person injured as a result of such accident, shall not be
"Id.

at 740.

"P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC.

65, 268 (1965).
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liable in civil damages for any acts or omissions relating to such
services rendered, unless such acts or omissions amount to wanton
conduct or intentional wrongdoing.'
Apparently the purpose of the act is to encourage aid to persons
injured in automobile accidents. The underlying rationale seems to
be that the legislation will encourage aid at the scene of accidents
by removing the possibility of liability for negligence. 2
Although similar statutes have been passed by many other states,3
there remain questions as to the constitutionality, the necessity, and
the effectiveness of such statutes.
The statutes have been attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that they abolish common-law remedies in violation of state constitutional guarantees of civil remedies. 4 The North Carolina Constitution provides that "every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law. . .. "'
Statutes which have eliminated liability for injuries caused by
negligent conduct, but have left unaltered liability for injuries caused
by higher degrees of misconduct, have been held constitutional as
mere restrictions of remedies, not a complete removal of them.'
Other states have upheld the abolition of the common-law remedy
for breach of promise to marry. 7 However, in Illinois under a
constitutional provision similar to North Carolina's,8 the abrogation
9
of the remedy for alienation of affections was held unconstitutional.
In Texas, also under a constitutional provision similar to North
Carolina's," statutory abolition of municipal liability for injuries
GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (Supp. 1965).
'N.C.
For the view that emergency aid is often withheld for fear of liability

see Kearney, Why Doctors Are Bad Sanaritans, READER'S DIGEST, May,
1963, p. 87; Survey, NEw MEDICAL MATERIA, April, 1961, p. 30.
aFor a comparison of various "Good Samaritan" statutes see 13 DE
PAUL L. REV. 297 (1964).
'See 43 B.U.L. REv. 140 (1963) ; 41 NEB. L. REv. 609 (1962).
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
aEmberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S.W.2d 326 (1957). The
dissenting opinion expresses the opposing view that a person injured as the
result of a negligence of another has a remedy only for that negligence, and
a statute that withdraws liability for negligence completely withdraws the
remedy. Id. at 130, 306 S.W.2d at 332.
'Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936).
'ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19.
Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
'"oTEX.
Heck v.
CONST. art. I, § 13.
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sustained on the streets and sidewalks was declared unconstitutional."1

In Osborn v. Leach the North Carolina court stated by way of
dictum that statutory impairment of the right to recover for an
injury would be unconstitutional. 2 The court has, however, held
the Workman's Compensation Act,' 3 which in some instances substitutes statutory remedies for common-law remedies, to be a reasonable exercise of the police power. 14 Quaere, whether the court will
view the Good Samaritan statute as a constitutional restriction of
the remedy, rely on Osborn and hold it unconstitutional, or uphold it
as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
If the statute proves constitutional, its necessity may still be
questioned. The act adds no additional inducement to persons already under a duty to aid the injured. In North Carolina these
include persons legally responsible for the original injury 5 and the
driver, regardless of fault, of any automobile involved in the accident.1
Even where there is no such antecedent duty, the act seems
unnecessary since it does not appear that under common-law rules
liability has been unjustly imposed in the Good Samaritan situation.' 7 The general rule is that one who voluntarily undertakes to
"Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
On rehearing the court stated two instances in which the abolition of
remedies had been sustained:
Thus it may be seen that legislative action withdrawing common-law
remedies for well established common-law causes of action for injuries
to one's "lands, goods, person, or reputation" is sustained only when it
is reasonable in substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare.
Id. at 199, 275 S.W.2d at 955.
12 135 N.C. 628, 631, 47 S.E. 811, 812 (1904).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-101 to -122 (1965).
"Lee v. American Enka Corp., 212 N.C. 455, 193 S.E. 809 (1937);
Heavner v. Town of Lincolnton, 202 N.C. 400, 162 (S.E. 909 (1932).
1 Parish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299
(1942). See generally PROssER, ToRTs 338 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), ToRTs § 322 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(c) (1953), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-166(c) (Supp. 1965).
" When liability has been imposed on a volunteer, there has usually been
some substantial departure from the accepted standard of conduct. The
most common departure seems to be a long delay in obtaining medical
assistance for the injured person after he has been taken into the exclusive
care and control of the volunteer. See, e.g., Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564 (1919); But see Steckman v. Silver Moon, Inc.,
77 S.D. 206, 90 N.W.2d 170 (1958).
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aid another is held to the exercise of reasonable care under the
circumstances to protect the safety of the person he aids.' However, the care that is reasonable in the emergency situation is only
that degree of care that would be exercised by a reasonable man
in a like emergency.'9

Generally Good Samaritan statutes have been deemed necessary
to encourage aid of physicians and other professionally trained persons who fear malpractice claims.20 In fact, many states have limited
the immunity to this class of persons.2 ' Among the reasons given
for the fear of liability are reported estimates that from six to nine
thousand claims for medical negligence or malpractice are filed each
year,22 and that one out of seven physicans has been subjected to
such a claim.3
The view has been taken that the "plight" of physicians has
been exaggerated. 24 From a survey of physicians in Connecticut,
it was concluded that the effect of a malpractice suit upon the practice of a physician is much less than is generally believed.2 5 Another
report indicated that such suits do not have a "serious or extended
effect" on the physician's practice.2 6 More specifically, an American
Medical Association search found no appellate cases involving
physicians at roadside emergencies." Furthermore, an investigation
of professional liability insurance claims indicated that few mal18 PROSSER, TORTS 339 (3d ed. 1964).

Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 28 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Cal. 1939);
Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 80 P.2d 952 (1938) ; Shloss Poster
Advertising Co. v. Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961).
" See Kearney, supra note 2; STETLER & MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAW 334 (4th ed. 1962); Survey, NEw MEDICAL MATERIA, supra
note 2.
21 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152
(Supp. 1963); Wis. STAT. ANNO. § 147.17(7) (1963).
2 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
April 11, 1959, p. 13.
" Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Professional Liability and the
Physician, 183 A.M.A.J. 695 (1963).
2" Averbach, Good Samaritan Laws, CASE AND COMMENT, March-April,
1964, p. 13; Steincipher, Survey of Medical ProfessionalLiability in Wash"ington, 39 WASH. L. REv. 704, 707 (1964).
25 See Wyckoff, The Effects of a Malpractice Suit Upon Physicians in
Connecticut, 176 A.M.A.J. 1096 (1961).
2" How State Medical Society Executives Size Up Professional Liability,
164 A.M.AJ. 580, 582 (1957).
"'Steincipher, supra note 24, at 706 n.21 (citing DOCTOR & LAW, Nov.
3, 1963, p. 3).
19
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practice claims have been based on the typical Good Samaritan
situation.28
Even if a negligence action is brought against a physician, the
plaintiff may have difficulty establishing that the physician failed
to fulfill his legal duty under the circumstances surrounding the
roadside treatment.2 Since cases involving knowledge peculiar to
the science of medicine require expert testimony, 0 the plaintiff must
generally produce as expert witnesses other physicians, who are often
reluctant to testify against fellow physicians. 1 Assuming such
testimony is available, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
physician failed to have the skill and learning possessed by other
physicians similarly situated, 32 or that he failed to exercise the required care, which is only reasonable care and diligence under the
circumstances.33
It has been suggested that it is not the fear of the ultimate
liability, but the "involvement" resulting from the commencement
of the action of malpractice or the mere allegation of negligence,
that is harmful to the reputation of the physician.3 4 If, as it has
been indicated, allegations of negligence do not often arise as a
result of roadside treatment,3" it seems that the fear of liability in
such situations has resulted from a carry-over from the increasing
fear of malpractice claims generally. Perhaps some approach to
this problem other than the Good Samaritan statute would have been
more appropriate.
The fact that the North Carolina version has eliminated some
of the problems of interpretation arising under other "Good Samaritan" statutes3" does not seem sufficient to insure its effectiveness.
"Id. at 706 n.21 (citing A.M.A. NEws, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 14, col. 2).

" Devices have been employed in some jurisdictions to facilitate the
plaintiff's recovery in malpractice actions. For a discussion of the application of some of these devices see 64 COLJum. L. Rnv. 1301, 1304 (1964).
Despite such attempts it is suggested that physicians occupy a protected
and favored position at law. Steincipher, supra note 24, at 732.
" Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
" See Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12
VAND. L. REv. 535, 539 (1959).
" Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
Id. at 168, 79 S.E.2d at 499.
"See Curran, supra note 31, at 542.
' See Steincipher, supra note 27, at 706.
"Problems of interpretation arise from the use of such uncertain terms
as "gross negligence," "emergency situation," "emergency care," and "good
faith." For criticism of such language in other statutes see 64 COLUm. L.
Ruv. 1301, 1308 (1964); 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 297, 300 (1964); 75 HAgv.
L. REV. 641 (1962).
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In order to encourage the aid of volunteers, the statute must first
be widely publicized, and it must give adequate assurance that the
threat of liability for negligence has been eliminated.
The statute will probably be publicized through professional
journals as well as through ordinary news media. Nevertheless,
persons who have allegedly failed to offer aid for fear of involvement may not be completely assured that the threat has been removed. Though the statute bars an action for negligence, the injured
person might still allege wanton conduct.3 7 There seems to be no
assurance that physicians will be protected against common-law
liability for abandonment by the statute.3 Furthermore, the fact
that the statutes vary from state to state as to persons and conduct
protected39 seems sufficient to defeat their effectiveness as to interstate travelers. °
In light of this discussion it is concluded that the enactment of
the statute will be of little value. In the first place it may be unconstitutional. Secondly it seems to be directed at an evil that may
not exist at all. Finally the statute may not be effective in encouraging aid from those to whom it is properly directed.'
" Wanton conduct is conduct which is in "conscious and intentional dis-

regard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others." Hinson v.
Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E. 2d 393, 397 (1956). However, in an
action for injuries resulting from operation of an automobile the evidence
showed a failure to keep a proper lookout and a failure to maintain control
of the automobile. It was held that there was a question for the jury whether
such conduct constituted wanton conduct. Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260,
34 S.E.2d 185 (1945) (construing South Carolina "guest statute").
"Once a physician has undertaken to render services, he must continue
such services, unless there is a limitation by contract, until the treatment
is no longer necessary, or until the relationship is dissolved by the parties,
or until reasonable notice has been given so that the patient may have an
opportunity to engage the services of another. Groce v. Myers, 224 N.C.
165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944). The statute protects acts or omissions relating
to such services rendered. It is possible, at least, that the act of leaving an
injured person after having undertaken to aid him will not be found sufficiently related to the services to be protected, or that it will be found to be wanton
conduct that is not protected by the statute.
so For a comparative treatment of the various statutes see 13 Dn PAUl. L.
REV. 297, 301 (1964).
" It seems highly unlikely that such persons would be aware of the
particular provisions of each statute, if they knew a statute existed.
"1On its face the statute applies to any person who renders aid under
the designated circumstances. By literal interpretation it seems that one
who has been responsible for an original injury would be relieved of liability
for negligence in rendering aid to the injured person. Perhaps the court
will avoid this undesirable result by interpreting the statute as relieving the
tort-feasor of liability for negligence in his capacity as rescuer but not
relieving him of his liability for aggravation as original tort-feasor. Normal-
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It seems that a possible result of the statute is that emergency
aid will not be encouraged in fact, yet a person injured as a result
of conduct that is a substantial departure from the accepted conduct
in like situations, but less than wanton conduct, would be denied
relief on the questionable belief that such denial has been necessary
to achieve a broader public service.
JERRY
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ly such tort-feasor is liable for the natural and probable consequences of
his tort, including aggravation. Bell v. Hankins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d
642 (1958).

